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ABSTRACT

CORPORATE REPUTATION AND STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE

MAY 1988

BRADFORD J.

KNIPES,

B.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph . D . , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Thomas Schneeweis

The objective of this study is to investigate
relationships among various dimensions of corporate
reputation and strategic performance.
Strategic performance may be considered to be the
relationship of the whole organization to its
environment.

The literature on strategic management has

recently focused on the use of finance theory and
measures of risk in addition to traditional
measures of performance.
economics,

accounting

The disciplines of management,

psychology, and sociology all

suggest

relationships between reputation and performance.

This

study examines possible relationships between corporate
reputation and strategic performance.
v1

The reputation

data is from Fortune's annual

survey of corporate

reputations from 1982 to 1984.

The sample consists of

the 98 firms that were surveyed in all

three years.

Performance and risk data for the same firms are from the
Compustat data base for the years 1977 to 1984.
sample was divided into two equal
each,

The

groups of 49 firms

so that results for one group could be checked by

comparison to results for the other.
matched for equal
overall

The two groups were

representation of industries and for

reputation.

The results show that reputation is related to
certain measures of strategic performance,
return on assets.

especially

Other accounting and market measures

of performance and risk generally are not related to one
another or to reputation.
related to total

In general,

reputation is not

stock return, but change in perceived

quality of management is strongly related to total
return.

stock-

Change in quality of management is also related

to prior quality of management.
The conclusion is that reputation is a major aspect
of performance.

The Fortune survey data may be regarded

as a valuable predictor of future return on assets. The
relationship of change in perceived quality of management
to total

stock return merits further study.

v 11

"Je tiens impossible de connaitre les parties sans
connaitre le tout, non plus que de connaitre le tout sans
connaitre particulierement les parties."

"I find it as impossible to know the parts without
knowing the whole, as to know the whole without
specifically knowing the parts."
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Pensees, Chapter I

VI 1 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
£.a_qe
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .
v
ABSTRACT.

vi

LIST OF TABLES.

xi

LIST OF FIGURES.xvi
LIST OF EXHIBITS.
chapter
I INTRODUCTION .
Definitions of Reputation and Performance ...
Importance of the Study.
Statement of the Problem
.
Literature Review .
Hypotheses.
Data.
Methodology.

xvi i
1
1
3
9
10
10
11
12

II LITERATURE REVIEW .
Strategic Performance .
Reputation: Subjective Performance Measurement
Accounting Measurement of Performance .
Market Measurement of Performance .
Comparison of Measures
.
Classification of Measurements for Strategy
Research.
Specific Hypotheses and Rationale .

13
14
22
35
37
47

III DATA AND METHODOLOGY.
The Data.
Methodology.

67
67
74

55
59

IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS .
89
Hypothesis One: Prior Objective Measures
. . .
89
Hypothesis Two: Subsequent Objective Measures
99
Hypothesis Three: Contemporaneous Objective
Measures.106
Hypothesis Four: Correlation of Reputation
Measures.113
V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH.164
Summary.164
Conclusions.173
Directions for Further Research .
185

ENDNOTES.187
BIBLIOGRAPHY .

x

190

LIST OF TABLES
page
TABLE 2-1
COMPARISON OF MEASURES
TABLE 3-1
DATA: Representation of Firms Among Industries.
TABLE 3-2
LIST OF VARIABLES.
TABLE 3-3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Market and Accounting
Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages.
TABLE 3-4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Market and Accounting
Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages.
TABLE 3-5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Market and Accounting
Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages.
TABLE 3-6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Market and Accounting
Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages.
TABLE 3-7
Reputation Measures
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1977-1981 Averages.
TABLE 3-8
Reputation Measures
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1982 Averages. . . .
TABLE 4-1
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Performance Measures.
. .
TABLE 4-2
Prior ROA with Risk Measures.
ANOVA
TABLE 4-3
Prior ROA with Reputation Measures. . . .
ANOVA
TABLE 4-4
Prior ROA with Reputation Measures. . . .
ANOVA
TABLE 4-5
Prior Total Stock Return with Performance
ANOVA
Measures.
TABLE 4-6
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Risk
Measures.
TABLE 4-7
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Reputation
Measures.
xi

65
80
81

83

84

85

86
87
88
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

TABLE 4-8
ANOVA: Prior Total
TABLE 4-9
SIMPLE REGRESSION:
TABLE 4-10
SIMPLE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-11
SIMPLE REGRESSION:

Stock Return with Reputation.

122

Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.123
Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.124
Prior Quality of Management
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.125

TABLE 4-12
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-13
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-14
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-15
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-16
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-17
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management.126
Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management.127
Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial
Firms.128
Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial
Firms.130
Prior ROA
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.132
Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.133

xi i

TABLE 4-18
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

TABLE 4-19
ANOVA:
TABLE 4-20
ANOVA:
TABLE 4-21
ANOVA:
TABLE 4-22
ANOVA:

Prior Quality of Management
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.134

Subsequent ROA with Reputation Measures.

135

Subsequent ROA with Performance Measures.

136

Subsequent ROA with Risk Measures.

137

.

.

.

Subsequent Total Stock Return with Performance
Measures.138

TABLE 4-23
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Risk
Measures.139
TABLE 4-24
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with
Reputation.140
TABLE 4-25
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.141
TABLE 4-26
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.142
TABLE 4-27
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Quality of Management
with Risk Measures and Quality of
Management.143
TABLE 4-28
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management.144
TABLE 4-29
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management.145
TABLE 4-30
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial
Fi rms.146

XI 1 1

TABLE 4-31
STEPWISE REGRESSION:

Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality
of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial
Firms.148

TABLE 4-32
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance
Measures.150
TABLE 4-33
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance
Measures.151
TABLE 4-34
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures. .
152
TABLE 4-35
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures. .
153
TABLE 4-36
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Reputation
Measures.154
TABLE 4-37
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with
Performance Measures.155
TABLE 4-38
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk
Measures.156
TABLE 4-39
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with
Reputation Measures.157
TABLE 4-40
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with
Performance Measures.158
TABLE 4-41
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk
Measures.159
TABLE 4-42
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.160
TABLE 4-43
STEPWISE REGRESSION: ROA
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.161
TABLE 4-44
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Quality of Management
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of
Management.162

xi v

TABLE 4-45
CORRELATION:

Reputation Measures,

TABLE 5-1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS BY HYPOTHESIS
TABLE 5-2
SELECTED

1982-1986.

.

163

.

LITERATURE RELATING TO THE RESULTS

xv

.

.

.

170

181

LIST OF FIGURES
page
FIGURE 2-1
SUMMARY OF STATED HYPOTHESES

xvi

.

64

LIST OF EXHIBITS
page
EXHIBIT 2-1
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES
.
EXHIBIT 3-1
DEFINITION OF COMPUSTAT VARIABLES
.

xvi l

63
72

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this dissertation is to investigate
the relationships among various dimensions of corporate
reputation and strategic performance.
the terms

In this chapter,

reputation and performance are defined,

the

importance of the relationship between reputation and
performance is examined,
hypotheses,

data,

and the literature review,

and methodologies to be employed are

briefly described.

Definitions of Reputation and Performance
The concept of reputation has been variously
defined.
general

Two narrow views of reputation lead to a more
view appropriate to the present study.

(1983:659)

Shapiro

defined reputation primarily in terms of

product quality,

as

"an asset...the goodwill

firm's brand name or loyal

value of the

customer patronage.

A firm

has a good reputation if consumers believe its products
to be of high quality."

Earlier,

Shapiro

(1982:21)

stated "...each consumer has some expectations regarding
product quality.
firm's

These expectations constitute the

reputation..."

But reputation is not limited to

1

product quality.
"The general
public

The dictionary defines reputation as

estimation in which a person is held by the

(The American Heritage Dictionary,

1985:

But reputation is not limited to persons.
present study,
general

1050)."

For the

corporate reputation is defined as the

estimation in which a firm is held by the public,

including estimations of more specific attributes such as
management or product quality.
be operationally defined as

Corporate reputation will

results of the Fortune

surveys of corporate reputation.
Performance is
general

such a fundamental

concept that its

definition is usually left implicit and

performance related definitions confined to particular
approaches or measures
Hill,

& Schneeweis,

performance as
functions

(e.g.

1986).

Chakravarthy,

1986;

McGuire,

The dictionary defines

"the way in which someone or something

(The American Heritage Dictionary,

For the present study,

1985:

922).

corporate performance is defined

as the results of a firm's operation.

Corporate

performance is operationally defined as certain variables
obtained from COMPUSTAT1

including total

return on assets.

2

stock return and

Importance of the Study
The relation of reputation to firm performance is
important in many ways.

Of primary importance is the

influence reputation may have on performance.
Modern corporate stakeholder theory suggests that
reputation influences performance because the price
stakeholders will

pay for implicit claims depends on

their expectations of future payouts
Shapiro,

1986:

12).

(Cornell

and

Implicit claims are unwritten,

because they are too nebulous and contingent to reduce to
writing at a reasonable cost.

An example of an implicit

claim is the promise of continuing service to customers.
Implicit claims are sensitive to reputation because they
are uncertain.
contractual

By contrast, explicit claims are

obligations,

like product warranties.

It is

easier for a firm to default on implicit claims, but they
may see honoring them as an investment in reputation.
In the same analysis, Cornell

and Shapiro consider

the distinction between investor and non-investor
stakeholders in the influence of reputation on
performance.

In explaining the response of stock prices

to announcements such as earnings and dividends, the
finance literature has ignored the role of non-investor
stakeholders.
customers,

Non-investor stakeholders include

suppliers, providers of complementary services
3

and products, distributors, and employees.

"...the

response of stock prices to announcements should reflect
investors'

assessments of the reaction of other

stakeholders to the information (Cornell
1986:

15).

and Shapiro,

If a firm's reputation suffers, non-investor

stakeholders may lower the value they place on a firm's
implicit claims, or attempt to transfer implicit
agreement into more costly explicit agreement, adversely
affecting the firm's cash flow.
To the degree that a strong reputation permits a
firm to have a relatively greater percentage of implicit
costs, that firm may have lower total
total

debt.

The low

debt ensures that the firm can more easily continue

to meet its implicit and explicit claims, and so it will
have lower total
risk as well

risk.

Thus reputation may influence

as performance.

In studies relating corporate social
CSR, to performance,

responsibility,

reputation is sometimes considered

an intervening variable.

Improved performance may come

as a result of the increased employee and customer
goodwill

that have been cited as an important outcome of

CSR (Soloman and Hanson,

1985).

CSR activities may also

improve the firm's reputation with important
constituencies

(e.g. bankers,

investors, the govenrment)

and may therefore bring economic benefits
4

(Moussavi and

Evans,

1987).

Indeed, banks and other institutional

investors report CSR considerations to be a factor in
their investment decisions

(Spicer,

1978).

An appreciation of the importance of reputation for
performance in the literature of economics is pointed out
by Kreps and Wilson

(1982).

Reputation is important in

"...contract and labor negotiations;
employment practices;
product;

in a firm's

in a firm's

'good name'

for its

in the maintenance of a cartel; and in

international

diplomacy (Kreps and Wilson,

To this list, Milgrom and Roberts

1982: 275)."

(1982: 304) add "credit

relationships...implicit contract models, and...the
provision of auditing services, bond ratings, job
recommendations, and the like."
Industrial

In the context of

Organization, Sherer points to the

"demonstration effect that sharp price cutting on one
market can have on the behavior of actual
rivals in other markets
Kreps and Wilson

(1982:

or would-be

253)."

(1982) present two game-theoretic

models that illustrate the role of reputation in the
predatory behavior of a monopolist facing potential
entrants.

The immediate cost of predatory pricing is a

worthwhile investment to sustain or enhance its
reputation, thereby deterring subsequent challenges and
assuring high performance for the monopolist.
5

Theoretically,

reputation, and especially perception

of quality of managment, are related to leadership
perception,

to the broader subject of social

and to underlying social

perception,

and cognitive processes

(Cronshaw and Lord,

1987).

(Fiske and Shelley,

1984), categorization (Cantor &

Mischel,

Social

1979) and attribution

cognition theory

(Kelley,

1973) are current

areas of theory development that relate to reputation.
Thus firm reputation is closely associated with the
entire field of firm performance measurement, and the
interrelationship between reputation and performance can
be studied through a variety of disciplines including
economics, management, psychology, and sociology.
Practically, within organizations, management and
leadership perceptions, affected by outside reputation,
involve key interpersonal

processes that affect formation

of status or influence structures and the development of
superior-subordinate relations
Ultimately,

these interpersonal

(Seers & Graen,

1984).

processes may affect

membership in a dominant coalition,

the choice of

strategy, and corporate performance.
Outside the organization,

the importance of

reputation is similar to the importance of expectations
in the macroeconomic sphere: they are pervasive, crucial,

6

and sometimes volatile influences.

Economic expectations

can be self fulfilling:
...for any particular set of current wages and
prices, there may exist multiple expectational
equilibria that exhibit "bootstraps"
properties; e.g., if households expect that
they will be unable to sell all their labor
both this period and next, then it will turn
out they they will be unable to sell all their
labor; but had they expected there to be
inflationary pressures this period and next,
then that would have turned out to be the case
instead (Neary and Stiglitz, 1983).

If future inflation is expected,
be taken that fuel

it.

individual

decisions may

If a stock market crash is

expected, the ensuing rush of individual

decisions to

disinvest brings it down.
Similarly, the fortunes of a firm may be influenced
by expectations of it.

Expectations of future

performance are an aspect of a firms reputation.
abitility to raise capital

The

is the ability to attract

equity or debt financing with the expectation of future
earnings, and those future earnings depend on the prior
ability to attract financing.
All

stakeholders'

organizations'

decisions are affected by

reputations.

Stakeholder's decisions

depend on predicting the outcomes of alternatives
available to them.

Corporate reputations are a major

input to those evaluations, because reputation
7

incorporates an expectation of future performance.

It

may also influence it, through favorable or unfavorable
decisions by investors, customers, competitors,
suppliers, and regulators.
Reputation is at once the product and the progenitor
of individuals'

evaluations of management.

In Fortune's

survey of corporate reputations for 1986 (Baig,
Merck was ranked number one.
P.

1987),

The company's chairman, Dr.

Roy Vagelos, described how this recognition of their

reputation further improved that reputation and will
likely benefit future performance:
It did great things for the morale of the
company and for our recruiting, because Merck
is not a familiar corporate name.
Now we are
recognized on campuses, so our recruiting
results have been just super (Fortune, 1988:
38) .
Reputation among experts is a major source of
information about management quality.

Discussions of

reputation, and management literature

and research in

general,

have implicitly assumed that the

quality of a

firm's management has a strong influence on the firm's
performance.

Management theory analyzes processes such

as leadership, motivation, and decision making on the
assumption that improving them will

improve firm

performance (Evans,

1970).

For example,

indicated that one

reason for high performance of
8

studies

have

Japanese firms relative to U.S.

firms is Japan's higher

emphasis on management and product quality (Vogel,
1979;1980).

Japan has established a "quality"

reputation.

Gillingham and Zinger (1986)

found that

quality of management, based on frequent and formal
training,

resulted in higher performance, as measured

return on equity.

Gupta and Govindarajan

(1984) found

that greater marketing/sales experience, greater
willingness to take risk, and greater tolerance for
ambiguity on the part of the SBU general manager
contribute to effectiveness in the case of "build" SBUs
but hamper it in the case of "harvest" SBU's.

Statement of the Problem
The idea that positive firm and management
reputation results in higher firm performance seems
inherently plausible, but specific relationships must be
established empirically.

However, management and firm

attributes are difficult to

ascertain objectively and

subjective methodologies have often been found necessary.
Unfortunately, the subjective measures of management
characteristics and firm attributes may result in certain
biases, e.g interviewer bias.

Objective measures of

strategic performance are also frequently questioned
(McGuire, Schneeweis, Hill,
9

1986).

This is true of both

accounting measures

(e.g.,

return on assets) and market

determined measures

(e.g. price/earnings ratio).

An aim

of this study is to empirically test the relationships
among alternative subjective and objective factors.
Results will

improve our understanding of those measures

currently in use.

The primary problem to be addressed is:
What are the relationships among expert
evaluations of management performance and
objective measures of prior, contemporaneous,
and subsequent performance?
Literature Review
Chapter II is a review of relevant literature
involving several

fields of research:

performance, decision making,
and perception.

strategic

reputation, attribution,

Selected works from the literatures of

accounting and market based performance are also
critically reviewed.

Hypotheses
Reputation is usually thought of as separate from
performance.

In this regard it is either a reflection of

prior performance, or a prediction of future performance.
Reputation is also seen as part of performance, as
representing additional

contemporaneous dimensions of
10

performance.

Generalized hypotheses, to evolve from

the literature review,

are as follows:

Hi:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to prior strategic performance.
H 2:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to subsequent strategic performance.
H3:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to contemporaneous strategic
performance.
H4:
The various dimensions of corporate
reputation are highly correlated.
Data
The data for this study consist of perceived firm
and management attributes obtained from Fortune's survey
of corporate reputations

(Baig,

1987, and prior surveys)

and accounting and market measures of firm performance
obtained from

the COMPUSTAT data base.

included in the Fortune study are:

The attributes

quality of

management; quality of products or services;
innovativeness;

long-term investment value;

financial

soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep talented
people; community and environmental
use of corporate assets.
performance include:
ratio,

responsibility; and

The accounting measures of firm

return on assets

average assets,

income growth,

(ROA), debt/assets
sales growth,

operating leverage, assets growth, and operating income

11

growth.

The market measures include alpha, beta, and

residuals.

Methodology
The study will

employ ANOVA, correlation analysis,

and simple and stepwise multiple regression analysis to
determine the relations among perceptions of

management

quality, prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent firm
performance.
In chapter III, the hypotheses, the data and the
statistical

methodology to be employed are presented.

In chapter IV,

numerous relations among the dimensions of

management performance and strategic performance are
evaluated.

In chapter V, the

conclusions from this

analysis and future directions for research will

be

discussed.
We close the beginning by reminding ourselves that
must understand something of performance throughout the
different disciplines to understand performance in the
field of strategic management, and we must understand the
performance of many firms in a variety of dimensions to
understand the performance of one firm in a single
dimension.

As Pascal

said, we cannot know the part

without knowledge of the whole, any more than we can know
the whole without knowing its parts.
12

CHAPTER

II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The objective of the present study is to investigate
relationships among various dimensions of corporate
reputation and strategic performance.

While the

literature dealing directly with these relationships is
quite limited,

relevant fields of study have

independently developed very extensive bodies of
literature.

Relevant fields of study include decision

making, perception, attribution,
accounting,

social

cognition,

finance, and strategic management.

The

present literature review is therefore at once broad and,
within each area,

selective.

The objectives of this

review are to establish the absolutely pervasive role of
performance measurement and reputation, to identify
specific theories and

'Search from the disparate fields

that are concerned with reputation or performance, and to
derive hypotheses about the relationships between
reputation and performance.
Strategic management literature is focused primarily
on the influence of managerial
organizational
1986;

Ryne,

performance

1986;

decisions

(McGuire and Schneeweis,

Branch and Gale,
13

on

1983; Melicher and

Rush,

1974).

Strategic management decisions include

merger and acquision decisions, capital
decisions, and new product decisions.
issue in many other ways,

however.

investment
Performance is an

For example, the

relationship between strategy making and structure was
found to be strongest among organizations that perform
well

(Miller,

1987).

The issue of performance is

implicit in all management literature because management
is variously defined as control or direction toward
performance.

Strategic Performance
In their comparison of alternative approaches to
measurement of business performance in strategy research,
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) state:
...the treatment of performance in research
settings is perhaps one of the thorniest issues
confronting the academic researcher today.
With the volume of literature on this topic
continually increasing, there appears to be
little hope of reaching any agreement on basic
terminology and definitions.
These authors recommend that in view of the breadth
and complexity of the topic, attention should be focused
on the perspective of the field of strategic management.
They argue that a multidisciplinary view will
discussion to fundamental
assumptions.

limit

differences in definitions and

But the differences in definitions and
14

assumptions are not fundamental.

The following

literature review yields some appreciation of the
commonality in measurement processes.

The same essential

structure underlies measurement processes in various
settings: decision loops incorporate perception and
social

cognition processes that are themselves decisions.

Different fields of study are undergoing parallel
development of similar concepts, with similar issues
arising.

Venkatraman and Ramanujam endorse Hofer's

observation that "...different fields of study can and
should use different measures of organization performance
because of the differences in their research questions"
(Hofer,

1983:

44; Venkatraman and Ramanujam,

1986: 802).

This should not be accepted to mean that measures
available to different fields are to be considered
mutually exclusive.

Many published papers amount to

introduction of concepts and measures to one field that
were developed in another.

The concerns of strategic

managment properly encompass the range of other
disciplines and a variety of measures.

Stakeholders1

Decisions

Many groups of decision makers, each with different
interests, are concerned with strategic performance.
Stakeholders include labor,
15

suppliers, customers,

creditors, boards of directors, management, governments,
and the communities in which an organization operates.
Among stakeholders, boards of directors are expected
to decide the compensation of top executives, holding
them accountable to shareholders for the performance of
the organization

(Cook,

1981; Mace,

1971).

Incentive

compensation plans are common, and salaries, fringe
benefits, bonuses, and the value of stock options
generally vary with the company's stock price (Rankin,
1982).

However, boards frequently fail

management accountable (Kerr and Bettis,

to hold
1987: 645, 658),

tending to grant "stratospheric salaries" that are
unrelated to an executive's measured performance (Vance,
1983: 74).

There is a growing interest in the impact on

corporate strategy and performance of different
alternative performance measures used in compensation
plans

(Kerr and Bettis,

Stata and Maidique,

1987; Miller and Scholes, 1982;

1980).

Empirical

results have often

been contradictory.
Labor is concerned with strategic performance as
increasing exposure of firms to international
threatens job security.

competition

For example, Bethlehem Steel's

union employees entered into concessionary contracts in
1983 and 1986 (Fortune,

1988:39).

Bethlehem's overall

reputation was ranked 302 out of 306 companies in
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Fortune's 1987 survey, despite recent dramatic moves to
improve their competitive position.
Suppliers,

investors, creditors, and communities all

look at an organization's reputation and performance for
assurance of its continued viability.

This fundamental

relationship leads to the first three general

hypotheses:

reputation may be expected to be related to past,
present, and future performance.
complete statement of general

(See Exhibit 1 for the

and specific hypotheses.

Exhibit 2 provides a diagrammatic summary of the
hypotheses.)

Legislators, tax authorities, bankruptcy

courts, and regulatory agencies all

consider the

reputations and performance of firms affected by their
decisions.
Managers'
all

decisions may represent the interests of

stakeholders

agents for all

(Hackett,

1985).

If managers do act as

stakeholders, one would expect that rather

than optimizing one or a few dimensions of performance
and reputation at the expense of others, managers would
strive to maintain a balance among them.

This suggests

the hypothesis H4: various dimensions of corporate
reputation are highly correlated.
Non-stakeholders are also interested in strategic
performance.

Security analysts want an earnings number

they can multiply by a standard price-earnings ratio to
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arrive at an estimate of the firm's value.

Economists

want to be able to estimate a corporate contribution to
national
financial

income.

Black contends that all

users of

statements want an earnings figure that results

in a constant price-earnings ratio (Black,

1980).

That

is to say, that they want to see accounting measures that
bear a dependable current relation to market measures.
This again suggests H3,

that contemporaneous measures are

closely related.

Performance Measurement
Venkatraman and Ramanujam recommend focusing on
measurement issues in performance(1986: 802).

"In its

broadest sense, measurement is the assignment of numerals
to objects or events according to rules"
1).

In essence,

1973: 428).
the same"

(Stevens, 1951:

"measurement is a relation"

"The fundamental

(Kerlinger,

(Kerlinger,

process of measurement is

1973: 432).

With recognition of

the similarity of measurement processes, one is free to
focus on the contents:

what is being measured, and how

are alternative measurements related?

Because the

process of measuring and making decisions is similar in
different contexts, we are free to look from one field of
study to another for useful
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concepts.

Thus, a major focus of research in business policy
and strategy

is how to measure organizational

performance (e.g. Chakravarthy,
1981;

Rumelt,

1974).

1986;

Lee and Zumwaldt,

Firm and management performance

have been evaluated with a wide variety of "objective"
(e.g. accounting and market) performance measures, but
less frequently with "subjective"
quality of management) measures
Hill,

1986).

stock return,

(e.g. expert ranking of

(McGuire, Schneeweis, &

Market measures of performance,

including

have been gaining prominence in comparison

to accounting measures of performance (Branch & Gale,
1983;

Pickens,

1985; Rappaport,

1983; Seed, 1985).

Strategic performance has traditionally been studied
only in terms of accounting return or stock market return
(Branch,

1980), but there is a growing interest in risk

as a dimension of performance (Jemison,
Gavin,

1982).

1987; Hayes and

This is associated with an increase in

transfer of ideas and methodology from the literature of
finance to that of strategy (e.g.

Lubatkin and O'Neill,

1987; Aaker and Jacobson,

Financial

1987).

theory says

that decision makers must be rewarded for the assumption
of risk, and that, ex ante,
positively related (e.g.,

risk and return should be

Brealy & Myers, 1981) as has

been found in many studies using stock market data (e.g.,
Hurdle,

1974).

However,

some empirical
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studies have

found, ex post, that firms may experience a negative
relationship between risk and accounting return (e.g.,
Bowman,
Thomas

1980;
(1986)

and then,

Bettis and Hall,

1982).

Fiegenbaum and

review the contradictory empirical

in their own study,

evidence

find a negative risk-return

relation for firms having return on equity below target
levels and a positive association for firms with return
on equity above target.

A field study of firms in the

banking industry found different strategies associated
with differences in risk, but not in return on assets
(Jemison,

1987).

A study of 96 small

and medium sized

firms found centralization of authority related to risk,
and found the relationships between risk taking and
organization structure to be different between high
performing and low performing firms

(Miller, 1987).

While it is expected that managers must anticipate
increased return for them to accept higher risk, a
dynamic game model

of the agency relationship between

corporate insiders and external

claimholders illustrates

that incentives to avoid risky debt by underinvesting may
be moderated by anticipation of improved reputation and
bond rating (John, Nachman, & Spatt, 1985).

While the

ex-ante forecast of return is generally based on the
expectation that the assumption of risk requires a
commensurate1y high return, ex-post measures of return
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may be inconsistent,

reflecting a variety of other

influences on actual

return.

This suggests the need to

evaluate H?, that measures of risk and reputation are
related to subsequent return.
An organization's accounting system generates
information on several

relationships that are considered

by many to be measures of risk.

This raises the

important question of the relationship between accounting
and market determined measures.

A study of 307 firms in

the period 1947 to 1965 found a high degree of
contemporaneous association between accounting and market
risk measures

(Beaver,

Kettler, and Scholes, 1970).

questions of intertemporal

The

association and relationships

for other firms and time periods remain.
The distinction between systematic and unsystematic
risk,

formerly applied only to return on stock

investments,

has now been applied to analysis of

strategic business units.

Aaker and Jacobson

(1987)

found that an accounting measure of unsystematic risk had
a significant positive relationship to ROI.

As a measure

of unsystematic risk, they used the standard error of the
residual

from estimation of accounting beta.

and O'Neill

(1987)

Lubatkin

found that mergers tend to be

associated with increased levels of unsystematic and
total

risk, estimated using the market model.
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These

results are both contrary to what might be expected
considering finance theory2.
Many alternative measures of performance are
available:

subjective or objective, accounting or market,

risk or return, unsystematic risk or systematic risk.

If

there is little correspondence among alternative measures
of performance,
information,

if each measure represents different

the choice of which measure or combination

of measures researchers and decision makers use will
substantial

effects.

have

If some measures are found to be

highly correlated within a time period, one or more may
be ignored as redundant.
relationships,

If there are intertemporal

if one measure predicts another, that also

has implications.

Decisions are made and research based

on assumed relationships that must be tested.

Reputation: Subjective Performance Measurement
Corporate Reputation
Corporate reputation has not received current
scholarly attention.

Treatments of corporate reputation

generally represent two approaches.

They either discuss

the value of a good reputation, or report the results of
a survey measuring reputation.

Occasionally, the latter

is presented as the outcome of some intervention.
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Influences on Reputation
Given that reputation is important, what determines
whether a reputation will

be favorable or not?

The

question of influences on reputation relates to Hi,
concerning the relationship of reputation to prior
performance.
Often,

results of a survey of reputations are given

ad-hoc explanations.
32 in overall

When IBM slipped from No. 8 to No.

reputation in Fortune's most recent survey,

these explanations were offered (Schultz,

1988:32):

Big Blue's decline reflects two years of
disappointing profits.
Fading demand for its mainframes and increasing
competition from other manufacturers of
personal computers and minicomputers have left
IBM a little groggy.
...(despite) tremendous progress in
transforming us into a sharper, more
competitive company.
Present management is not to blame.
The
current strategy is probably far more astute
than current profits would suggest.
The implication is that experts'

subjective

evaluations of management depend simply on recent
profitability,

ignoring other contrary evidence.

If this

were so, then reputation would follow automatically from
the bottom line, those concerned for their reputations
should work to improve profitability and researchers
could ignore measures of reputation as redundant.
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The

possible relationship of reputation to prior ROA is
reflected in H i a.
However, the opposite is implied concerning Bethlehem
Steel, which had the same abyssmal overall

reputation

rating for 1987 as for 1986, despite a tremendous
improvement in profitability (Schultz,

1988: 39).

An

alternative to H i a is H i b, that reputation is related to
prior stock return rather than to ROA.
Specific actions are being taken by management with
the hope of improving reputation.
engaged to help prepare annual

Design consultants are

reports that will

encourage readers to look beyond "such facts as pretax
profits and earnings per share"

(LeMan, 1986).

The

strength of brand reputations are being exploited to
sharpen corporate image which in turn can be used to help
the firm break into new product sectors
1986).

(Bowens, J.C.,

Corporate image advertising is gaining in

importance, according to Joseph Brouillard, whose company
performs this service (Reed,

1984;

Brouillard, 1983).

Public relations research surveys of the many
constituencies of a firm are conducted, and business
decisions based on the results

(ONeill, 1984).

While actions intended to improve reputation are
based on assumed relationships, there is evidence
suggesting many competing influences on reputation
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formation.

In the Brouillard study, characteristics

identified as important to a winning reputation included
quality of products,

flexibility, high-caliber

management, honesty, customer service, market leadership,
and good communications including effective advertising
(Marketing News,

1986).

Another study found that

favorable customer assessment of the quality or products
and services provided an average improvement in corporate
image of 16% (Lewis,

1985).

A survey of community

leaders by the Center for Corporate Community Relations
indicated that firms that were active in the community
were rated highly on nine dimensions that included
executive leadership and general
Journal,

1987).

reputation (Personnel

This suggests that, among the dimensions

of reputation in the Fortune survey, corporate and social
responsibility should be significantly related to quality
of management.

These studies together recommend

evaluation of H4, concerning the relations among the
various dimensions of reputation.
A survey of 235 firms found that corporate
reputation, as measured by the Fortune survey, differed
with regard to firm's implementation of human resource
succession systems

(Friedman,

1986).

Implications were

drawn for improving management of succession systems.
national policy study by the Work In America Institute
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A

recommended employment security as an integral part of
corporate strategy for improving a company's performance
and reputation (Roscow and Zager, 1985).
While corporate reputation has received little
explicit sholarly attention, extensive research has been
conducted in the closely related fields of perception,
attribution, and social

Social

categorization.

Cognition

Social

cognition is the study of how people make

sense of other people and themselves
1984).

(Fiske and Shelley,

Reputation grows out of this sense-making

activity.

Much of corporate reputation, especially

quality of management,

is about other people.

Corporate reputation does include dimensions such as
product quality,

however.

likely reflects social

Reputation for product quality

influences on cognition.

The

process of cognition, and group influences on cognition,
have similarities, whether the object of cognition is a
person or not.

Perhaps the definition of social

cognition should be broadened to include study of social
influences in cognition of objects in addition to people.
As a field of study, social

cognition has grown to

incorporate many related subjects,
social

categorization, and social
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including attribution,
perception.

Each of

these subjects will

be considered briefly in its relation

to corporate reputation.

Perception
Subjective measures of firm performance are based on
individuals'

perceptions.

magazine's annual

In this study,

Fortune

survey of corporate reputations

represents experts'

perceptions.

Four constructs from

the literature of perception (cf., Schneider, Hastorf,
and Ellsworth,

1979; Dember, 1964; Weiner,

1977) are useful

in the present study; perceptual

difference threshold,
perception.

1947; Arbib,
lag,

halo effect, and selective

These are discussed below.

Perceptual

lag is the delay between an event and the

observer's awareness of the event.

Kerr and Bettis

(1987:648) observed that three studies of the
relationship between compensation and stock return
(Benston,
all

1985; Coughlan & Schmidt,

1985; Murphy,

1985)

erroneously measured a CEO's compensation as the sum

of salary payments and bonus awards distributed in a
given year:
To the extent such compensation is based on
performance, bonus awards at the end of year t
represent a board's perception of a CEO's
performance in year t.
Salary payments
distributed over year t, however, are based on
a board’s perceptions of a CEO's performance in
‘the previous year, t-1.
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This implies perceptual

lags on the part of the board

that are less than one year: at the end of a year the
board is aware of the executive's performance during that
year.

However,

if the board's perceptions of management

are partly based on accounting measures rather than on
direct observation of the CEO's behavior, there is a
further delay: management's actions may not result in
accounting performance for years.
Another perceptual

delay may be introduced if

management performance is evaluated on the basis of
market measures: stock price changes depend on
investors's perceptions.
hypothesis

(cf.

Fama,

instantly reflect all

However, the efficient-markets

1976)

states that security prices

available information.

Bethlehem

Steel's reputation was ranked 302 out of 306 companies in
Fortune's 1987 survey, despite recent dramatic moves to
improve their competitive position.

For example,

Bethlehem has reduced its operating costs by over $130
per ton, to about $400; they have almost doubled
productivity in tons per plant employee; they have spent
over $2 billion in modernization since 1981,
of their flat-rolled steel
23% in 1982;

so that 80%

is continuously cast, up from

income from steel operations has improved by

more than $230 million over 1986 (Fortune,
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1988:39).

There is strong indication of a perceptual
Steel's continued low reputation.
CEO,

stated "the whole steel

lag in Bethlem

Walter F Williams, the

industry has to communicate

our story better to the public and to our employees."
Perceptual

lag would be reflected in support for Hi and

lack of support for H3:

reputation would be found to be

related to prior performance and not related to
contemporaneous performance.
Difference threshold has been defined as "the least
change in stimulation that can be detected when the
system is already being stimulated"

(Dember,

1964).

For

example, an expert who is continually informed of the
performance of firms in an industry will

not perceive a

change in that performance which is below a certain
magnitude.
experts'

This likely will

result in some stability of

perceptions in the Fortune survey, because only

noticeable changes cause revision of perceptions.
Resistance of perceptions to revision would make it less
likely that significant relations would be found to
performance, and increase the likelihood that

and

would be rejected.
The halo effect influences perceptions when a single
characteristic overrides assessment of an individual's
other characteristics

(Griffin & Moorhead, 1986: 79).

a classic study, Asch (1946),
29

In

formed two groups of people

and gave one group a list of personality traits
containing the word "warm" and the other group an
identical

list containing the word "cold."

Both groups

were asked to further describe the individual whose
traits had been listed.

People who worked with the list

which contained the word warm said the individual must be
humorous,

intelligent, and popular.

The other group said

the person was serious and aloof, and did not have many
friends.

The halo effect may have a serious impact on

performance evaluations in organizations
Beatty,

(Bernardin &

1984).

The perception that management had accomplished a
high ROA might lead one to assume the company had a high
degree of ability to attract, develop, and keep talented
employees.

Alexander and Bucholtz (1978) and Bowman and

Ha ire (1975) have suggested that social

responsibility

may be indicative of management skill which may carry
over into other management areas.
(1986)

Cornell

and Shapiro

suggest that reputation gained from performance on

one set of implicit claims may influence customers'
willingness to pay for another set of implicit claims.
The result of a halo effect might be a high degree of
correlation among the perceived attributes in the Fortune
survey,

representing acceptance of H4.
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Selective perception is allowing current needs and
past experiences to partly determine what persons pay
attention to and what they perceive.

The Fortune survey

was sent to "senior executives, outside directors, and
financial

analysts."

Each of them is involved in

somewhat different decisions.

Each decision is based on

that person's perceptions of firms in the industry.

So

each person can be expected to attend somewhat
differently to available information.
experts'

The Fortune

perceptions would likely be different from those

of consumer advocates,

for example.

Since the Fortune

sample is to some degree homogeneous, one might expect
respondents as a group to base their perceptions more on
certain objective performance measures than on others.
This would lead one to expect that experts'

perceptions

would be more closely related to some measures of prior
performance than to others, and that those perceptions
would be more predictive of some than of others.

This

suggestion is the basis for each of the specific
hypotheses.

Attribution
Closely related to the process of perception is
attribution.

Attribution is the attempt to assess and

evaluate people based upon their behavior (Kelly,
31

1973).

To understand events, people develop their own implicit
theories of behavior.

Attribution theory began with the

work of Fritz Heider (1958), who believed that people
have a natural

tendency to see events in terms of causal

relationships. Calder identified attribution theory as a
conceptual

base for studies of leadership (Calder, 1977).

The process of attribution is pervasive as
stakeholders, managers,

subordinates, competitors,

suppliers, buyers, and regulators all

base their

decisions in part on their attributions of causality to
one another.

"A favorable stock market evaluation of

upper-level management justifies attractive managerial
compensation packages,

keeps shareholders happy, allows

easier access to capital,

facilitates relatively

inexpensive acquisitions, and defends against takeovers
(Branch and Gale,

1983: 41)."

A number of studies have looked at relationships
involving performance and attributions of leadership
(Butterfield,

Powell, & Mainiero,

Rush, & Thomas,

1978;

Lord, Binning,

1978; Rush, Thomas, & Lord,

Phillips and Lord,

1981).

1977,

Butterfield and Powell

(1981)

manipulated performance descriptions and found this
explained nearly half of the variance in attributions of
leadership style.
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An organization's performance is often seen as caused
by the quality of its management,
organization's managers.

it is attributed to the

Experts'

evaluations of quality

of management in the Fortune survey are attributions.
Quality of management is an important consideration in
investor decisions

(Graham et al, 1962).

found that major institutional

investors considered the

quality of management to be the single
criterion in the selection of stocks
Associates,

1975).

A Harris poll

most important

(Louis

Harris and

Thus stock price can be seen to

depend on a process of attribution.

Firms perceived as

excellent may have superior access to capital
to facilitate favorable future performance.
Granatelli and Martin (1984)

found

necessary
However,

that the stock market

returns of "well managed" firms did not

outperform a

portfolio of randomly selected companies from the

same

industries.
Boje and Whetten

(1981)

studied the attribution of

influence in interorganizational

networks.

They found

that strategy, constraints, and centrality were
significantly related to attributed influence.
Several
useful.

constructs from attribution theory are

First, the covariance principle states that we

attribute the cause of an action to the one factor with
which it most strongly covaries
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(Kelley, 1967).

Second,

internal

versus external

attribution refers to whether

the cause is seen as being within or outside the person.
The discounting principle states that our confidence in
an internal

attribution is lowered, or discounted, to the

extent that plausible external
present (Kelley,

explanations are also

1971) .

Attributions are based on three types of information.
Distinctiveness information indicates how prominent a
factor is.

Consensus information indicates whether other

individuals in the situation are associated with the same
results.

Consistency information indicates whether the

association is stable over time.

An attribution of the

quality of management of a firm will

depend on all of

these sources of information, and thus on the
relationships with alternative measures of performance.
These relationships will

be evaluated with H ]_.

Perception and attribution are important in
compensation decisions, because a frequent concern is
whether the success or failure of a strategy was managerderived or due to factors unrelated to the actions of the
management.
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Accounting Measurement of Performance

Advantages
In a review of selected literature of organizational
performance, accounting based measures were found to be
dominant (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill,

1986).

Accounting measures have an advantage for research in
that they are easily available from corporate sources and
commonly available data bases.

Accounting data is

available at the business unit level, while stock market
data is limited to the corporate level.

Accounting

measurements are certified as conforming to generally
accepted accounting principles

(GAAP), which are

established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB).

Accounting data are "primary" data in the sense

that they are direct measurements of the organization,
undistorted by a further level of judgement.

An

important question is whether stock market measures,
being partly based on accounting measures, represent a
correction for accounting bias, or the introduction of a
further bias.

Disadvantages
The potential
been well
(1986) and

for bias in accounting measures has

documented by Briloff (1981;1972), Branch
Beaver and Dukes
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(1973).

While

accountants should strive to calculate an accounting
income

which accurately reflects economic income, many

perceptions and arbitrary

judgments are necessary in

doing so, and there are many pressures and opportunities
for distortion

(Getschow,

1980).

discretion are the allocation of

Among areas of
receipts and

expenditures, choice of methods of depreciation,
determination of pension fund obligations, valuation of
inventories and other assets, how to consolidate the
financial

statements of merged firms, and selection among

alternative international
multinational

firms

accounting standards by

(McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill,

1986:134).
Aaker and Jacobson

(1987) note that ROI is widely

used in practice, which suggests that reputation would be
most closely related to ROA, as stated in Hla.
have strongly criticized ROI
Solomon,

1971; Harcourt,

Scholars

(Fisher & McGowan, 1983;

1965): the return in the

numerator is not necessarily related to the investment in
the denominator.
The accounting system reports only financial
transactions, while ignoring other important business
events such as the failure to preserve assets, decisions
to downgrade product quality, and technological
that make equipment obsolete (Curtis,
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1985).

changes

Accounting

rules do not allow capitalization of expenses for less
tangible assets,

such as product quality, reputation,

product portfolio, technological
development.
Cordiner,

base, and human

The former CEO of General

Electric, Ralph

recommends that several measures of strategic

performance be looked at simultaneously,
position, technological

including market

leadership, personnel

development, productivity, and employee attitudes.
suggests that measures of reputation will

This

be different

from accounting measures of performance, a suggestion
that will

be evaluated with H\ and H2.

Market Measurement of Performance
Several

scholars have recommended the application of

finance theory and market measures of performance to
questions of strategic management research and practice
(e.g.

Rappaport,

Rappaport,

1985).

1981,1983; Johnson, Natarajan &
They argue that market measures of

firm performance are better than accounting measures, and
that finance theory and risk analysis should be used to
guide strategic choice.
H1 &»

This leads to consideration of

that reputation is related to prior total

stock

return.
Several

recent strategic management studies have used

finance based methodologies such as the Capital Asset
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Pricing Model
1983; Seed,

(CAPM)

(e.g.

Kudla, 1980; Branch and Gale,

1985; and Chakravarthy & Singh,

forthcoming).

Some research uses stock price data without reliance on
finance theory (Bourgeois,

1985).

A review of recent

published research in several management and strategy
journals

(Academy of Management Journal, Academy of

Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly,
California Management Review, Journal of Business
Strategy, Journal

of Management, Management Science,

Planning Review, Strategic Management Journal) finds
market data used to address a wide range of topics,
including the usefulness of strategic planning,
implications of market share, generic strategies,
corporate directors, managment turnover, acquisitions,
buyer/seller power, distinctive competence, managerial
style, and organizational
Marcus,

goals

(Bromiley, Govekar, and

forthcoming).

The CAPM resolves several methodological

difficulties

in the use of accounting-based performance figures
1976)3.

It is not an ad hoc model, but is a fully

specified equilibrium model
(Fama,

1976).

in firms'

of a firm's stock return

Tests have shown that in setting the

market value of firms,

Myers,

(Fama,

investors adjust for differences

accounting procedures

1984: 64-81,

248-257).
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(Fama,

1976; Brealey &

Investors are thought to

immediately evaluate the impact of management change on a
firm's future earnings,

so that other events do not

confound the effect. This suggests that market measures
may better predict future accounting performance than
will

accounting or reputation measures, a suggestion

evaluated under H£.
There is rapidly increasing interest in risk in the
management literature (March and Shapira,
1987; Crouch and Wilson,

1982).

1987; Jemision,

Again, classical

decision theory says that choices are made among
alternative actions on the basis of the mean (expected
value) and variance (risk) of the probability
distribution of possible outcomes

(Arrow,

1965).

Most

authors assume that individuals are risk averse, and so
must be compensated for assuming additional
commensurate additional

return (Ross,

contradictory evidence,

however,

(Brenner and Shapira,

1981).

risk with
There is

in studies of mergers

1983; Mueller,

1969), and in an

inter-industry study of the risk-return relationship
(Bowman,

1980).

There are open questions about the

relationship of risk aversion to adversity (March and
Shapira,

1987;

Kahneman and Tversky,

1979).

Managers

believe that fewer risks should, and would, be taken when
things are going well.

They expect riskier choices to be

made when an organization is "failing"
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(MacCrimmon and

Wehrung, 1986).

However, there is evidence that wealth

rather than adversity leads to risk taking and innovation
(Hamilton,

1978; Mansfield,

1968; Brinton, 1938).

in considering H ^ this study will

Again,

evaluate possible

relations between risk and subsequent return.

Managers

appear to depart from the prescriptions of decision
theory without justification, and the quality of their
decisions might be improved by training (March and
Shapira,

1987:

1415).

The CAPM implies that investors price an asset to
receive an expected return on a security E(R.) as
specified in equation (1)

(Lee, 1985:

223):

E(Ri) « Rf + CE(Rm) - Rf]Pi
where:

Cl)

Rf = The riskless rate of return.
E(R ) = The expected return on the market stock
m
portfolio.
p. = The regression coefficient, which is equal
1
to the ratio of the covariance of the
return on security i with the return on
the market portfolio normalized by the
variance of the return on the market
portfolio.
2
(i-e-’

Systematic Risk:

= °im/0

Beta

Thus, the expected return on any security is composed
of two parts, the risk-free rate of return, and a risk
premium. The risk premium is a proportion, P-, of the
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excess of market return,

Rm, over the risk free rate, Rf.

The firm's beta coefficient, (3, summarizes the
relationship between its stock return, and that of the
market portfolio.

This suggests (3 i s a meaningful

measure for strategic management.

As the return on the

market portfolio changes, the firm's return changes at
the rate beta; the change in the firm's return will

be

beta times the change in the return of the market
portfolio.

If a firm's beta is greater than one, and the

market falls, the firm's stock price will
proportionately.

fall more than

Thus, assuming a fully diversified

portfolio, beta is the relevant measure of risk, and
determines the return of a security:

it will

earn the

riskless rate plus some compensation for its risk.
relationship will

be evaluated with H 2 b.

This

Beta is

referred to as "systematic risk," because it is that part
of a firm's risk that is directly related to changes in
the return of the market as a whole.

Unsystematic Risk: Mean Square Error (MSE)
Beta, or systematic risk,

is that part of a

security's risk which cannot be eliminated.

In addition,

there is an unsystematic component which can be
eliminated when that security is held in combination with
other securities in a diversified portfolio.
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The market

model

expresses the return on any asset at a point in

time, R-t, as a linear function of the market return,
Rmt, plus a random error component, e-t (Lee, 1985:225)4:

R

a • + b • R . + e •.
1
l mt
it

it

(2)

Using equation (2), the market model, total variance
c

for the ith asset (o.) can be decomposed as:
2

2

2

2

o, = b.o (R ) + a .
i
i' '"nr
“ei
So the total

risk or total

(3)

variance of a security is

the sum of a systematic component, b. times the variance
of the market return, and an unsystematic component, the
variance of the error term, called the "mean square
error"

(MSE).

same as p .

It can be shown that b.

in Eq.

in Eq.

(3)

is the

(1), the CAPM.

Stock Return
While the market model

(2) allows decomposition of

risk into systematic and unsystematic components,
decomposes total

it also

stock return into three components: firm

specific return, a. or "alpha";

return due to general

market movements, b^R t, and a residual
e-t or "residuals".

error component,

Alpha is the return that a firm

obtains in excess of that due to general market
movements.

The second term, b.R t,
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is the firm's share

of general market movement.

Residuals are random changes

in return, the difference between observed return and
return predicted by the linear relationship between the
firm's total

Abnormal

return and that of the market.

Return Model

It has been argued that if stock price data is to be
used, event studies are the appropriate methodology (Kerr
and Bettis,

1987: 652).

Finance theory states that stock

price incorporates information and expectations about the
future prospects of the firm.

Accepting that the price

continuously incorporates these expectations, the impact
of a particular factor can only be determined by
examining changes that could not reasonably have been
anticipated by the market.

To distinguish the effect of

an event on a stock's returns, the researcher must
separate the returns that would have been expected
without the event (predicted or normal

returns)

from

those attributable to the event (prediction error or
abnormal

returns) .

Brown and Warner (1980: 206) note the three major
techniques for estimating abnormal
mean adjusted return,

returns.

The first is

in which the average return on a

stock outside the period of interest is subtracted from
the observed return in the period of interest.
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The

second is called market and risk adjusted return, or
simply "abnormal

return."

Rearranging Eq.

(2) to solve

for e. yields:

e

+ b

it

This form is called the "abnormal

(4)

return model," and

has been used in numerous event studies in both economics
and finance literature (Morse,

1982;Fama,

1976).

It is

"abnormal," in the sense that it is the difference
between the observed return,
return,

(a. + b-R ^).

R-t, and the expected

In applying this model

to an

event, a. and b. are estimated in the period preceding
the event, and e. t, the prediction error,

is calculated

after the event.
The third technique is called market adjusted return,
and differs from market and risk adjusted return in that
a is constrained to equal

zero, and (3 is constrained to

equal one (Brown and Warner,

1980: 208)^.

Morse found that the capital markets are highly
efficient in the sense that significant stock price
changes, and abnormal
surrounding companies'

returns, were observed in the days
announcements of relevant events.

It is telling that "surrounding" means before as well

as

after the public announcements that inform those who are
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not inside traders.

Relevant events include dividend

increases, product sales,

favorable and unfavorable

earnings forecasts, acquisition and construction
projects, and stock splits.
In management studies, the abnormal

return model

has

recently been used to study the relationship between
executive compensation and stock performance (Kerr and
Bettis,

1987), the effects of strikes on firm stock

performance (Newmann,

1980), and the effects of

management strategic planning on firm stock value (Kudla,
1981).

Again,

the effect of reputed quality of

management on subsequent performance will
with H?.

be evaluated

In light of the foregoing review,

expected that measures of risk will

it may be

be found to be

significantly related to subsequent performance.

CAPM:

Problems

While the market model

is generally regarded as a

pure positive prediction model, there are statistical
theoretical
Warner,

problems

1984:

(Black and Jensen,

166-178).

1972;

Brown &

Use of the market return as a

measure of performance does assume that investors
evaluate firms appropriately.

Managers may feel

that

investors are inaccurate or uninformed, but the market
reaction can correct for some manager biases in
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and

accounting.

Because they represent total

firm

performance, market measures are too aggregate to apply
to evaluation of individual
strategic moves.

projects which may represent

Finally, the use of market return and

risk measures implies the manager himself or herself is
acting for the benefit of fully diversified investors,
who are immune to the unsystematic component of risk.

To

the degree that the manager is concerned with
undiversified investors,
then total

including the firm and self,

risk may be a better measure of firm risk due

to strategic management.
Managers try to avoid exposure to unsystematic risk
by managing well

and by choosing to work for businesses

that have low unsystematic risk (Aaker and Jacobson,
1987).

Shareholders can compose diversified portfolios,

but other stakeholders are concerned for unsystematic
risk, and managers represent them as well.

So high

quality of management should be associated with low
unsystematic risk.

For management to accept increases to

unsystematic risk, they should require higher expected
return.
There are several

reasons to question the assumed

efficiency of capital markets
Marcus,

1987: 20).

(Bromily, Govekar, and

Investors tend to overreact to events

(e.g. de Bondt & Thaler,

1985), events have different
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effects depending on the size of firms,

stock returns may

be reduced when inflation is significant,
weekend and day of week effects,

there are

investors'

actual

portfolios include assets other than stocks, and
investors may perceive an intrinsic value in dividends.

Comparison of Measures
A comparison of several

aspects of accounting,

market, and qualitative measures of performance is
summarized in Table 2-1

(all

tables are placed at the

ends of their respective chapters).

It is noteworthy

that across the three types of measures,
a matter of degree.

subjectivity is

With nominally qualitative measures,

experts are free to form their own opinions,
will

knowing they

remain "experts" while those opinions are generally

considered creditable.
investors'

evaluations.

Market measures depend on
Investors evaluate the prospects

of a stock with a more purely pecuniary interest, and
that may make them more objective.

They are advised by

the "experts," however, and so investors own opinions
cannot be much more "objective."

Stock market crashes

certainly do not reflect changes in the economic value of
firms, but in perceptions, and especially in the
attribution of others'
price movements.

perceptions and resultant future

Finally, there is also subjectivity in
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accounting.

The wide lattitude for discretion in

accounting measurement was discussed above.
There is substantial

controversy regarding the

relationship between various strategic performance
measures and top executives'

compensation.

results have been inconsistent.

Empirical

Some researchers have

reported a strong relationship between stock return and
compensation while others report no relationship
(Murphy,

1985;

Redling,

1981).

Baumol

(1959) suggested

that executives are compensated on the basis of
organization size rather than stock return, and so
attempt to maximize sales while maintaining a minimum
profit level.

Following this suggestion,

research has

found compensation to be positively related to sales and
unrelated to net profit (Meeks & Whitting,
1975; Ciscel,

1975; Cosh,

1974; McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing,

Lewellen and Huntsman (1970)

1962)

found the opposite: that

compensation was strongly related to profits and
unrelated to sales.
will

In light of this controversy,

it

be interesting to observe the object of

compensation:

the relation of quality of management to

performance.
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Peters and Waterman (1982) used both objective and
subjective measures to identify

excellent corporations.

Objective measures used were compound asset growth,
compound equity growth,

ratio of market to book value,

average return on total

capital, average return on

equity, and average return on sales.
represented innovativeness.

Subjective measures

Select industry experts were

asked to rate the companies in their industries on their
20-year record of product or service innovation and on
their ability to adapt rapidly to changing industry
conditions.
Peters and Waterman's purpose was not to compare
approaches to evaluating performance, but to identify
excellent firms.

Their validation was subjective and

partial

1983).

(Carroll,

Similarly, Chakravarthy used

Peters and Waterman's assignation of excellence, and also
consulted the Fortune ratings for the same reason: to
identify a sample of excellent firms
1986).

(Chakravarthy,

Both studies simply accepted the experts'

evaluations as further evidence of excellence.

Industry Differences
Joan Woodward (1965)

found that organizational

design

depended on technology. An industry can often be
characterized by its technology.
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Woodward found that

successful

small

batch and continuous-process plants had

flexible management structures while successful mass
production operations were rigidly structured.

More

recent investigations have offered some support for this
technological

imperative (Fry, 1982).

A major contribution to the literature of strategic
management is Michael

Porter's competitive strategy

approach, based on industrial
1980).

organization (Porter,

Industrial organization economists have developed

insights into the range of performance available in
certain industries
Scherer,

1970;

(e.g., Caves, Gale, and Porter, 1974;

Ravenscraft 1983).

Porter says that the industry is the appropriate
level

of analysis for strategy.

An industry is defined

as a group of competitors together with their suppliers,
buyers,

substitutes, and potential

entrants.

choice among alternative strategies will

The best

depend on the

relative power of the interacting firms, on the potential
rate of growth,

the technological

sophistication, the

rate of innovation, and management capability.
The importance of each of these factors will
different for different industries.

For example, are

there many capable managers, or just a few?
potential

be

If the

growth rate in an industry is low and there are

few opportunities for innovation, established firms with
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substantial

assets will

easily be able to protect their

positions while enjoying relatively high returns and low
risk.

If potential

for innovation and growth in an

industry are high, a large amount of fixed assets may
limit adaptability, and successful

firms may require the

highest quality of management and the assumption of a
high degree of risk.
Thus,

it is likely that some relationships among

measures of reputation,

risk, and performance are

specific to industries and to time periods.

For the

period 1971-1977, the mean dividend yield was, as
expected,

significantly greater and the mean beta

significantly lower for utilities and banks than for
industrial

firms

(McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill; 1986).

Regulation insulates utilities and banks from general
market movements.

In addition to lower systematic risk,

utilities and banks experienced lower unsystematic (MSE)
and total

risk (standard deviation of total

stock

return).

While utilities experienced lower total

and

systematic risk, they also had higher market return.
This inverse relationship between risk and return is
reasonable in light of the poor performance of the market
during this period.

The different risk and return

characteristics of non-industrial

firms makes it likely

that experts would perceive them differently and that
52

this would show up in different relationships between
reputation and performance for industrial
industrial

and non¬

firms.

Aaker and Jacobson (1987)

found that both systematic

and unsystematic risk were related to ROI.

However, the

association of unsystematic risk with return was found to
be less uniform across industries.

"It is positive and

significant for consumer goods businesses and for
businesses producing components, materials, and supplies,
but small

and insignificant for capital

(Aaker and Jacobson,

1987:

goods businesses

287)."

In a replication of Mintzberg's study of the nature
of managerial work, Kurke and Aldrich found, by combining
their results with Mintzberg's, that management behavior
was more similar between organizations within an industry
than between organizations in different industries
and Aldrich,

1983:982).

(Kurke

If there are industry specific

differences in management behavior, there are likely to
be differences in experts'

perceptions and attributions

concerning that behavior.
In testing the relationship between stock price and
compensation, Murphy (1985) considered an industryrelative performance measure,

in which a firm's return

was compared to the average return of its industry.
Results showed that different performance measures
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affected various components of compensation differently,
and that raw rates of return were preferrable for
predicting overall

top management compensation.

Hypotheses H]a and H2c are further evaluated with the
data divided into groups of industrial

and non-industrial

firms, as described in Chapter I I I.

Interdependence of Perceptions
Perceptions of managerial
based on perceptions of

and firm performance may be

strategic performance.

Likewise, the interdependence of these
actual

perceptions and

accounting and market performances has

important

implications for strategic management decisions.
As Branch and Gale point out:
While the stock market does tend to reward
companies for high ROE (profitability), growth,
R&D intensity, payout, and interest coverage
(low risk), the policy implications of these
(separate) relations are less clear.
For
example, a company that sought to increase its
growth at the expense of its ROE might
adversely affect its stock price.
Moreover,
the trade offs between R&D intensity and ROE;
payout and growth; etc., should not be ignored.
Investors do not reward companies for high ROE,
interest coverage, R&D intensity, or payout per
se.
Rather such characteristics are preferred
only when they are viewed as forecasters of a
favorable future.
The aim of academic research, then,is the same as
that of practicing managers, boards of directors, and
investors:

to determine the causal
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relationships between

quality of management,

strategy, and strategic

performance; to develop better attributions.

Classification of Measurements for Strategy Research
While finance theory has tended to concentrate on a
single measure of performance, the strategic management
literature is developing a multi-trait perspective on
performance (Lenz,

1981; Venkataraman & Ramanujam, 1986).

Venkatraman and Ramanujam adopt a two dimensional
cl assificatory scheme for the measurement of business
performance in strategy research.
financial

Performance may be

or operational; based on primary or secondary

sources.
Financial

performance "centers on the use of simple

outcome-based financial

indicators that are assumed to

reflect the fulfillment of the economic goals of the
firm...which has been the dominant model
strategy research (p.803)."

Financial

in empirical

performance

indicators include accounting-based measures such as
sales growth, profitability (e.g.

return on assets), and

earnings per share. With the current view that marketbased measures may be more important than accountingbased measures,

financial

by measures like total

performance may be represented

stock return.
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Operational
financial

performance represents a broader, non-

conceptualization of business performance.

Operational

performance is represented by such measures

as "market-share, new product introduction, product
quality, marketing effectiveness, manufacturing valueadded, and other measures of technological

efficiency

within the domain of business performance"

(Venkatraman K

Ramanujam,

1986: 804).

innovativeness

Product quality, and

(new product introduction), are among the

dimensions of the Fortune survey.
All

of the dimensions of reputation would be

considered measures of operational
value as a long-term investment,
use of corporate assets.

performance, except

financial

soundness, and

All of the market and

accounting measures in the present study would be
considered measures of financial

performance.

Venkatraman and Ramanujam futhcr characterize data by
i

its source as "primary" or "secondary"

(1986: 804),

Primary data is collected directly from "organizations,"
Secondary data Is "from publicly available

records."

Hy

these definitions, primary and secondary are not mutually
exclusive categories: much data,

such as financial

statements, are collected directly from the organizations
and publicly available.

Venkatraman arid Ramanujam

Identify COMPUSTAT data, used In the present study, as a
‘,6

secondary data source, and PIMS

(Product Impact of

Marketing Strategies) data as primary data.

But

COMPUSTAT accounting data is obtained directly from
companies, and made available to subscribers unchanged.
Many identical measurements could be obtained from either
PIMS or COMPUSTAT.
Still, the spirit of the distinction is a desirable
one:

secondary data should be distinguished not by being

public, but by being derived from primary data through
some further processing that changes it.
study,

In the present

survey data on corporate reputation are clearly

secondary:

reputation is an indirect measure of a firm,

changed by the filtering of experts'

cognitive processes.

A more difficult question concerns market measures.
they primary or secondary?

Are

By the revised definition,

they are considered secondary measures of organizations,
because like reputation, they are derived from primary
data processed with a variety of influences,
reputation,

including

in the cognitions of investors.

The authors draw three implications from their
classification of measures.

First, conceptualizations of

performance that combine financial

and operational

indicators are preferable because they employ a broader
construct space,
information.

i.e.

they provide additional

The present study will
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evaluate this claim

by determining whether various financial

and operating

indicators from secondary sources are strongly related. A
highly correlated measure does not offer new information.
This relates to H4:

the various dimensions of corporate

reputation are highly correlated.
Lack of a significant relationship between measures
may mean independent information, a contribution to a
more comprehensive causal
income, by itself,

schema.

To know a firm's net

is to know nothing about the firm.

Any stakeholder requires additional

knowledge of

performance to make a competent decision.

Financial

analysis traditionally adds meaning to isolated numbers
from a single firm by combining them in ratios, trend
analysis, and industry comparisons.

The present study

performs a similar task at a higher level

of analysis by

evaluating relations among measures across firms, to see
how reputation may add a further dimension of
understanding to market and finance measures.
The recent move to adopt other theories including
finance theory to strategic management research needs to
be followed by examination of the relationships of those
theories to existing strategic management theory,

so that

they can be incorporated and development can proceed.
This study will

consider both subjective and

objective

measures of management and firm performance and analyze
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their interrelationships.

The significance of these

interrelationships for management's strategic decisions
will

be discussed in the final

chapter.

Specific Hypotheses and Rationale
From the diverse literature relating to reputation
and performance,

some major issues have led to the

present hypotheses.

The first generalized hypothesis is:

Hi:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to prior strategic performance.

The first hypothesis follows from the fundamental
nature of cognition:

it depends on processing of

information from prior events.
If H] is true, comparison of the Fortune data for one
period with COMPUSTAT data for a prior period should
reveal

significant relationships.

A variety of more

specific alternate hypotheses are suggested by the
literature review and the available data.

A few are

selected as especially likely or interesting, with others
left implicit.

Specific hypotheses which relate to Hi

include:
Hia:
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are significantly related to prior
ROA.
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This follows from the prominence of ROA among various
measures of performance.

It is widely published, and

easily understood.
Hib:
Experts' perceptions of long-term
investment value are significantly related to
prior total stock return.
The questions raised about biases in accounting
measures, and the recent high regard for market measures
suggests that experts may be following firm's stock
market performance in forming their perceptions.

H2:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to subsequent strategic performance.

The interest that stakeholders have in an
organization is that its performance will
the future.

affect them in

That is why they search for information and

form cognitions. This hypothesis represents the
expectation that stakeholders are successful

in this and

that reputation is an accurate prediction of future
performance.
In a generalized sense,

it can be said that if H2 is

true, combining the Fortune data with the COMPUSTAT data
should predict subsequent strategic performance better
than the COMPUSTAT data alone.
related to H 2 include:
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Specific hypotheses

H2a*
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are a significant predictor of
subsequent total stock return.
This suggests that among expert perceptions, the
explicit expectation of future investment value will

be

con firmed.
H2b :
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are a significant predictor of
subsequent ROA while prior risk measures are
not.
Recent trends in research emhphasize market measures.
Finance theory leads to the expectation that measures of
risk will

anticipate future performance.

This hypothesis

compares risk measures with experts' opinions of
management quality for prediction ability.
H2g:
A combination of selected dimensions of
prior reputation and risk explains more of the
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior
reputation or risk separately.
There is a possibility that reputation and risk have
independent predictive ability with respect to ROA.
so, then in combination,

they will

If

have increased

explanatory power.
Two further hypotheses derive from considering both
of the general

hypotheses.

H3:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to contemporaneous strategic
performance.
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If perceptual
hypothesis will

lag is substantial, then this

not be supported.

However,

if reputation

adjusts as quickly as the efficient market hypothesis
suggests stock prices do,

then this hypothesis will

be

confirmed.
H4:
The various dimensions of corporate
reputation are highly correlated.
This hypothesis is supported if management acts as
agent for a variety of stakeholders, and seeks to balance
various dimensions of performance.

Reputation also

likely reflects a halo effect.
Exhibit 2-1 lists the hypotheses.

Figure 2-2

presents a schematic summary of the hypotheses.
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EXHIBIT 2-1
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES
Hi:
Corporate reputation is significantly related to
prior strategic performance.
Hia:
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are significantly related to prior
ROA.
Hib:
Experts' perceptions of long-term
investment value are significantly related to
prior total stock return.
H2:
Corporate Reputation is significantly related to
subsequent strategic performance.
H^a*
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are a significant predictor of
subsequent total stock return.
H2b:
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are a significant predictor of
subsequent ROA while prior risk measures are
not.
H2c*
A combination of selected dimensions of
prior reputation and risk explains more of the
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior
reputation or risk separately.
H3:
Corporate reputation is significantly related to
contemporaneous strategic performance.
H4:
The various dimensions of corporate reputation
are highly correlated.
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FIGURE 2-1
SUMMARY OF STATED HYPOTHESES
Prior

Contemporaneous

Subsequent

HI:
Performance

Reputation

ROA
Total

Quality of Management

Stock Return

Long Term Investment
Value

H 2:
Reputation

*

Performance

Long Term Investment
Value

*

Total

Quality of Management

*

ROA

Quality of Management
+ Risk Measures

«

ROA

Reputation

i <

Performance

Reputation

Reputation
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Stock Return

TABLE 2-1
COMPARISON OF MEASURES
Dimensions
of Comparison

Accounting
Measures

Market
Measures

measure of
systematic
risk

accounting beta

beta

measure of
firm specific
risk

Qualitative
Measures

mean square
error(MSE) of
residuals

measure of
total risk

1everage,
earnings
variabi1ity,
earnings growth

measure of
return

e.g. ROA, ROE

stock market
return, dividend
y i el d

avai1abi1ity

easy: corporate
sources and
data banks

easy: corporate
sources and
data banks

require
data
col 1ection

subjectivity

within GAAP:
managers
discretion on
depreciation,
transfer pricing,
pricing of
long-term assets
and liabilities,
allocation of
expenses

investors'
judgements
exaggerated by
speculation

experts
inherently
subjective

"long term
investment
value"

(continued next page)
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TABLE 2-1: (continued).
theoretical
basi s

ad hoc,
accessible

CAPM is widely
imp1icit,
accepted as
inaccessibl e
a fully
specified
equi1ibrium
model of a firm's
stock return, but
there are
objections

assumptions

GAAP

investors
evaluate firms
appropriately

experts
evaluate firms
appropriately

scope

limited to
specific entities,
performance
measures and
time periods

global,
nearly
instantaneous

variable,
narrow to
global

focus

data collected
for other
purposes

investors
motivated by
stock return

variable
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CHAPTER

III

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The importance of corporate reputation in modern
commerce is partly attributable to the great amount of
publicity through advertising and reporting in business
periodicals.

A considerable exchange of reputation

information is exemplified by Fortune magazine's annual
survey of corporate reputations, one of the most
comprehensive and widely circulated measurements of
reputation available. The Fortune survey data
operationally define reputation for the present study.
Similarly, various measures of performance have gained a
high degree of currency by virtue of their accessabi1ity
through public sources such as the COMPUSTAT data base.
This currency supports widespread acceptance of these
measures as proper representations of performance.
data for the present study are discussed below,

The

followed

by the methodology employed.

The Data
Reputation data,

including management quality, were

obtained from Fortune magazine's

annual

survey of

corporate reputations conducted for 1982 through 1984.6
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In 1984, the survey covered the ten largest firms
(largest by sales)

in each of twenty-five industries7 and

included 250 companies

(Sellers,

1985:

18).

Fortune

polled 7,000 senior executives, outside directors, and
financial

analysts each year.

about 50% for each year.

The response rate was

Respondents were

asked to rate

the ten largest companies in their industry (for
analysts,
quality

the industry they follow) on eight attributes:
of management, quality of products and services,

innovativeness,
soundness,

long-term investment value,

ability to

attract, develop, and keep

talented people, community and

environmental

responsibility, and use of corporate assets.
rated on a scale of 0

financial

Firms were

(poor) to 10 (excellent).

An

average score for the eight dimensions was computed for
each firm.
In addition to the eight attributes measured in the
survey,

a ninth variable was calculated as the average of

the other eight.
quality."

This variable was named "average

Finally, another reputation variable was

calculated from the Fortune data.

An improvement in

quality of management is often sought to obtain high
performance.

Marginal

quality of management was computed

as the per cent change in quality of management® from
1982 to 1984:
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Mm

=

C(M2

-

M])/M2]xlOO

(5)

Fortune's is one of the most comprehensive and widely
circulated surveys of managerial
Both the

attributes available.

quality and number of respondents is comparable

or superior to

the "expert panels" usually gathered for

such purposes.

Other studies have had fewer or less

expert respondents, or have been less broadly based.
example, Dess and Robinson

(1985)

For

surveyed corporate

executives, but did not include analysts or outside
directors.

MBA students have been used (Vance,

Alexander and Bucholtz,

1975;

1978), but they are likely less

expert than Fortune's senior executives,
analysts, or outside directors.

financial

The New York Times

evaluated the quality of management of ten major
companies in a telephone poll

limited to MBA graduates of

six leading schools of management (Clymer,

1987).

Fortune had 8200 responses, while some studies have
relied on individual
1978).

experts

(Vance,

1975; Moskowitz,

Chakravarthy (1986) used as the basis for his

study of firms in the computer industry the assignation
of excellence by Peters and Waterman (1982).

They in

turn relied on "an informed group of observers of the
business scene."

Chakravarthy also used the Fortune

rankings to select additional
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excellent companies.

For the present study,

Fortune data collected in the

years 1982 through 1984 were used.

Through this period,

there were 98 firms that were surveyed in all
years, compared to 250 firms in 1984.

three

This was due to

firms entering or leaving the top ten in their
industries.

This is the sample that was studied.

The

sample is not random in the sense that it is comprised of
firms continuously among the top ten in their industries.
These firms may be different from ones that have entered
or left this select group during the period of study, and
from firms which have not been among the top ten in their
industries.
Two types of error are possible: type 1,
null

in which the

hypothesis is rejected when in fact there is no

significant relationship;

and type 2,

in which the null

hypothesis is accepted when in fact there is a
significant relationship.

To reduce the possibility of

either type of error, the sample was divided into two
equal

groups of 49 firms each,

so that results for one

group could be checked by comparison to results for
another group.
The two groups of firms were matched for equal
representation of the 25 different industries and for
overall

reputation.

This was done by first sorting all

of the firms in ascending order by industry number, and
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then sorting the firms within each industry by overall
reputation.

Then the ordered list of firms was randomly

allocated to the two groups by selecting the first firm
to group 1,

the second to group 2,

and so on.

The result was that group 1 and group 2 had

the third to group 1,

the same number of firms in each industry when there were
an even number of firms available from that industry in
the sample,

and a number of firms that differed by 1 when

there were an odd number of firms in the sample (see
Table 3-1) .
To allow evaluation of possible industry differences
suggested by the literature review,

the two groups were

further divided into subgroups of 39 industrial
non industrial

and 10

firms.

Accounting and market measures of firm performance
were selected from those in the COMPUSTAT data base.
Exhibit 3-1 defines the COMPUSTAT measures.

These

variables were chosen because of the importance they have
been given in previous studies and in practice.
Beta, or systematic risk,
Sharpe-Lintner capital

is important because the

asset pricing model

implies that

it is the sole determinant of differences in the expected
returns among risky capital
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assets.

There is widespread

EXHIBIT 3-1
DEFINITION OF COMPUSTAT VARIABLES
A1pha (A).
From the market model, return in excess of
that due to general market movements (Lee, 1985).
Assets Growth (AG).
Percent change in total assets.
AG = aTA/TA = Change in Total Assets/Total Assets
Average Assets (AA).
Beginning assets less ending assets
divided by two.
AA = (BA-EA)/2 = (Beginning Assets-Ending Assets)/2
Beta (B).
From the market model, the covariance of a
stock in relation to the rest of the stock market (Downes
and Goodman, 1985). Systematic, nondiversifiable risk
( Lee, 1985) .
Debt/Assets Ratio (D/A).
Total debt divided by total
assets ( Lee, 1985).
D/A = TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets
Income Growth (IG) .
Percent change in income. This is
income before extroardinary items and discontinued
operations, after all expenses, including special items,
income taxes, and minority interest - but before
provisions for common and/or preferred dividends
(Industrial Compustat, 1981).
IG = AI/I = Change in Income/Income
Operating Income Growth (QIG).
Percent change in
operating income.
Operating income is net sales less
cost of goods sold and operating expenses before
deducting depreciation, amortization and depletion
(Industrial Compustat, 1981).
OIG = ^01/01 = Change in Operating Income/Operating
Income
Operating Leverage (QL).
The extent to which fixed costs
are used in a firm's operation.
Breakeven analysis is
used to measure the extent to which operating leverage is
employed (Brigham, 1975).
OL = (S-VC)/(S-VC-F) = (Sales-Variable Costs)
(Sales-Variable Costs-Fixed
Costs)
(continued on next page)
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EXHIBIT 3-1

(continued) .

Residual Error (RE).
risk (Lee, 1985).

From the market model, unique firm

Return on assets (RQA) .
A measure of operating
performance, of how well assets have been employed since
being received by the firm (Garison, 1976).
ROA = (NI+IE)/ATA = (Net Income + Interest Expense)
Average Total Assets

Sales Growth (SG) .
Percent change in sales.
Sales is
gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts,
returns, and allowances (Industrial Compustat, 1981).
SG = aS/S = Change in Sales/Sales
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agreement on the overriding importance of systematic risk
in the determination of the expected return both for
individual
1976).

corporate stocks and for portfolios

(Fama,

When any of the assumptions of CAPM are

unwarranted, unsystematic

(firm-specific)

likely to affect market price (Levy,

risk is also

1978).

The

unsystematic component of risk is represented by the mean
square error of the residuals

(MSE), an estimate of the

variance of the disturbance term in the market model.
Accounting variables were chosen to represent risk and
return in light of their use in previous studies
(Thompson,

1976)

Table 3-2 is a listing of all

of the variables in the

study, noting the time period of the variable, and if it
is a performance or risk measure.

Tables 3-3 to 3-8

contain descriptive statistics of all of the variables
for both groups.

It is apparent that the groups are

quite similar.
Methodo1ogy
The hypotheses will

be tested through correlation

analysis, ANOVA, and both simple and stepwise
regressions.

Compared to ANOVA, which merely indicates

the significance of linear relationship,

regression

analysis further indicates how the variables are related,
and multiple regression analysis permits examination of

the combined influence of more than one independent

variable.

Correlation Analysis
A correlation coefficient is a measure of linear
association in a bivariate population,

indicating the

degree to which variation in one variable is related to
variation in the other (Nie et al,

1976).

Correlation

analysis was used to determine relationships among the
eight dimensions of experts'

perception.

Analysis of Variance
Analysis of Variance, ANOVA, was used to reveal
significant relationships between ROA or total
return and each of the other variables.

any

stock

In ANOVA, the

independent variable must be an integer-valued, nonmetric
factor.

ANOVA examines the variability of the response

variable between samples formed on this factor relative
to variability of the response variable within samples.
Values of the factor correspond to categories or levels
of a "treatment."
means,

If the samples,

represented by their

are "spread out" compared to the variation of

observations within each sample, then the null
hypothesis,

that there is no difference among the means

of populations from which the samples were taken,
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is

rejected (Miller and Wichern,
means are identical,

1977).

If the population

it is unlikely that sample means

would vary more than the observations within samples.
Thus,

if sample means are found to be significantly

different,

then the null

hypothesis is rejected and one

is led to infer that at least one of the population means
is different from the others,

that the independent and

dependent variables are related.
ANOVA requires integer values of independent
variables to be used as non-metric factors. To obtain
integer values based on the independent variable, ten
portfolios were formed from each group by ranking firms
by their z-scores^ on return on assets

(ROA).

In

separate ANOVA's, portfolios were similarly based on
total

stock return.

Ten portfolios were formed so that

each "portfolio" contains the minimum sample of five
firms

(in the case of the tenth portfolio,

four firms).

The rank number of the portfolio then was used as the
independent variable.

Thus,

if sample means on the

response variable are found to be significantly
different,

then the null

hypothesis is rejected and one

is led to infer that at least one of the population means
is different from the others,

that there are real

differences between firms with respect to the "response"
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measure, when they are grouped according to the specified
"factor."
This approach was taken to provide a sensitive test.
If either ROA or total

stock return is significantly

related to any of the independent variables,
up with this design.

That is,

it will

show

if just two of the ten

portfolios are likely drawn from different populations
with respect to the response variable,
probability will

be significant.

Thus,

the reported F
if there are no

significant simple relationships found, one may have
substantial

confidence there are none.

robust in this respect.

However,

The result is

some type 2 errors,

significant F probabilities when there is no real
relationship between independent and dependent variables
are likely.

This could result from a spurious difference

in the dependent variable between only two of the ten
portfolios,

for example.

Duplication of the analysis for

a second group of firms provides a check on this.

Each

independent variable was analyzed in a separate ANOVA,
using the SPSS procedure "ONEWAY."
included all

of the performance,

measures.
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Independent variables

risk, and reputation

Simple Regression Analysis
Simple regressions were performed on selected
variables in order to further evaluate bivariate
relationships through examining the significance of
individual

beta coefficients.

considered included ROA, total
of management,

The dependent variables
stock return, and quality

representing the most important among,

respectively, accounting, market, and reputation measures
as determined in the literature review.
dependent variable,

each of four independent variables

was considered in a simple regression:
the market model),

For each

residuals

(from

standard deviation of income, quality

of management, and beta.'

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis
Preceding analyses: correlation, ANOVA, and simple
regression, merely examined the simple bivariate
associations among variables.

Multiple regression

analysis estimates the degrees of influence of different
independent variables on a dependent variable.
furnishes tests of the statistical

It

significance of the

combined influences of independent variables and of the
separate influence of each independent variable on a
dependent variable (Kerlinger,

1973).

multiple regressions were performed.
78

Several

stepwise

In this procedure,

the variable that explains the greatest amount of
variance in the dependent variable will

enter first, the

variable that explains the greatest amount of variance in
conjunction with the first will
In other words,

enter second, and so on.

the variable that explains the greatest

amount of variance unexplained by the variables already
in the equation enters the equation at each step.
Questions adressed include:

Which measures or

combinations of measures best explain the variations in
perceptions of management quality?

Does management

quality have any ability to forecast subsequent
performance?

Do measures of perceived management quality

add to knowledge of past risk as a predictor of future
performance?

The analysis involved both leading and

lagging the data to explore time-related interactions.
Several

possible relationships were considered,

involving the same variables that were considered in
simple regressions.

In each stepwise regression, the

independent variable entered first will

be that which was

most significant among those considered in simple
repressions with that dependent variable.
obtained will

be identical.

The statistics

Of interest will

be the

significance and order of inclusion of remaining
independent variables as they are added to the regression
equation.
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TABLE 3-1
DATA: Representation of Firms Among Industries.

Industry
Number

Number of
Group 1
Firms

Industrial
20
23
26
28
29
32
33
34
36
38
40
41
42
44
45
Total
Industrial
Non-Industrial
91
92
95
96
97
Total
Non-Industrial

Number of
Group 2
F i rms

3

2
1
4
3
2
1

0

4
3
3
0
1
1
3
3
3
4
4
4
3

0
1

4
3
2
4
4
5
3
39

39

3

3

1

1

3
2

3

1

2

1

10

Total
Fi rms

10
49

80
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TABLE 3-2
LIST OF VARIABLES.
P=PERFORMANCE MEASURE
R=RISK MEASURE
SUBSEQUENT MARKET
(82 TO 84 AVG.)
R
P

P
R
ACCTG
(82 TO 84 AVG.)

R
P
P
R
P
R
P
P

PRIOR
MARKET
(77 TO 81 AVG.)
R
P

P
R

VI
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
V8
V9
VIO
Vll
V12

CUSIP NUMBER
STANDARD MARKET ADJUSTED RETURNS
BETA
STANDARD ERROR OF BETA
ALPHA
STANDARD ERROR OF ALPHA
RESIDUALS
MARKET RETURN
STANDARD DEVIATION OF MARKET RETURN
TOTAL STOCK RETURN
STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL STOCK RETURN
R SQUARED

V13
V14
V15
V16
V17
V18
V19
V20

DEBT TO ASSETS RATIO
RETURN ON ASSETS
AVERAGE ASSETS
STANDARD DEVIATION OF OPERATING INCOME
SALES GROWTH
OPERATING LEVERAGE
ASSETS GROWTH
OPERATING INCOME GROWTH

V21
V22
V23
V24
V25
V26
V27
V28
V29
V30
V31

STANDARD MARKET ADJUSTED RETURNS
BETA
STANDARD ERROR OF BETA
ALPHA
STANDARD ERROR OF ALPHA
RESIDUALS
MARKET RETURN
STANDARD DEVIATION OF MARKET RETURN
TOTAL STOCK RETURN
STANDARD DEVIATION OF TOTAL STOCK RETURN
R SQUARED
(continued next page)
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TABLE 3-2 (continued).
FORTUNE
(1982)

PRIOR
ACCTG
(77 TO 81 AVG.)

SUBSEQUENT FORTUNE
(82 TO 84 AVG.)

V32
V33
V34
V35
V36
V37

QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT
QUALITY OF PRODUCTS
INNOVATION
LONG TERM INVESTMENT
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS
ABILITY TO ATTRACT, DEVELOP,
AND KEEP TALENTED PEOPLE
V38 CORPORATE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
V39 USE OF CORPORATE ASSETS
V40 AVERAGE QUALITY

R
P
P
R
P
R
P
P

V41
V42
V43
V44
V45
V46
V47
V48

DEBT TO ASSETS RATIO
RETURN ON ASSETS
AVERAGE ASSETS
STANDARD DEVIATION OF OPERATING INCOME
SALES GROWTH
OPERATING LEVERAGE
ASSETS GROWTH
OPERATING INCOME GROWTH

V49
V50
V51
V52
V53
V54

QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT
QUALITY OF PRODUCTS
INNOVATION
LONG TERM INVESTMENT
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS
ABILITY TO ATTRACT, DEVELOP,
AND KEEP TALENTED PEOPLE
V55 CORPORATE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
V56 USE OF CORPORATE ASSETS
V57 AVERAGE QUALITY
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TABLE 3-3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting
Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages.

Mean
Market Measures:
A1 pha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

83

Standard
Deviation

-0.0869
-0.0038

1.3962
1.3964

1.3301
1.4071

1.2484
1.2059

147.71
155.51

55.40
60.15

9299.50
7569.83

12983.41
8502.23

-0.5535
-0.5532

0.1745
0.1944

-0.5676
-0.5293

0.1745
0.1964

-0.3978
-0.3510

0.3790
0.4063

TABLE 3-4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting
Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages.
Mean
Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

84

Standard
Deviation

-0.0928
-0.0722

1.1083
0.8226

0.6078
0.6668

1.1619
0.9141

164.90
176.88

58.33
60.26

6204.95
5237.49

8963.82
6017.21

-0.8297
-0.8570

0.3709
0.2308

-0.8216
-0.8776

0.3196
0.2232

-0.9378
-1.0019

0.5396
0.4396

TABLE 3-5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting
Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages.
Mean
Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:
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Standard
Deviation

1.1145
1.1097

0.3793
0.4729

7.8695
8.1551

2.0752
2.3020

554.79
557.14

142.70
129.88

281.19
232.26

514.64
376.55

0.2387
0.0589

0.5080
0.9123

TABLE 3-6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Market and Accounting
Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages.

Mean
Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:

86

Standard
Deviation

1.0810
1.1402

0.3819
0.4325

7.5722
8.0136

2.1026
2.2333

546.23
549.49

134.32
126.32

251.15
213.67

474.80
352.89

0.1289
0.1797

0.0726
0.4606

TABLE 3-7
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Reputation Measures
1977-1981 Averages.

Mean
Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibility
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
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Standard
Deviation

6.6480
6.5243

0.9016
0.8687

7.0524
6.8990

0.7151
0.7235

6.2196
6.1157

0.8540
0.8081

6.1241
6.0547

0.7886
0.8986

6.5449
6.5049

0.9859
1.1686

6.2992
6.2035

0.8503
0.8541

6.3220
6.3041

0.6935
0.6897

6.1971
6.1204

0.7313
0.8016

6.4245
6.3400

0.7259
0.7734

TABLE 3-8
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Reputation Measures
1982 Averages.

Mean
Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
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Standard
Deviation

6.5747
6.5129

0.9363

7.0292
6.8718

0.8309
0.8115

6.1584
6.1110

0.9919
0.9396

6.0047
6.0194

0.9538
0.8474

6.3229
6.3188

1.2043
1.2583

6.1467
6.0900

0.9892
0.8898

6.0200
6.2131

0.7488
0.7352

6.0684
6.0467

0.9276
0.8433

6.3135
6.2731

0.8586
0.8222

1.1002

CHAPTER

IV

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As shown in Chapter II,

the literature review,

important questions exist concerning the relationships
among various dimensions of corporate reputation and
strategic performance.

These questions are addressed

through evaluating the stated hypotheses.

The emphasis

is on testing significance of possible relationships.
Relationships among various

risk and performance measures

are also tested.

Hypothesis One:

Prior Objective Measures

H2:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to prior strategic performance.
To evaluate H ],

the significance of relationships

between reputation and prior accounting and stock market
performance is tested,

as

is the significance of

relationships between prior performance and various other
measures of risk and performance.
relationships among all

Results for

performance measures are

presented first.
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ANQVA
Prior
ANOVA's

ROA.

with

Tables

4-1

through

classification of

prior accounting performance:
1977-1981.

In

performance,

Tables

risk,

firms

contain

results

into portfolios

z-score of average

4-1,4-2,

and

4-3

and

reputation,

4-3,

measures

respectively,

of

by

ROA for
of
are the

independent variables.
In Table
that

between

subsequent
highly
high

4-1,

ROA averaged

ROA,

averaged

significant

ROA

in

continued
The

the only

for

lack of

important.

strive
and

to

total

It also
convey

and

in

a

This was

of firms.

Firms with

relationships
is

with other

probably more

expect performance on
for

example,

ROA to be
as managers

balance between current profitability

looks

shareholders.

and other possible

support

that

independent

accounting

1984.

and

subsequent period.

stock return,

lack of

4-2

1981,

is

likely be able to enjoy

of performance

this

suggests

Table

groups

responsibility to

significance
represents

in

One might

to achieve

their

both

relationship

to

from 1982 to

significant

subsequent measures

related

from 1977

a period will

advantages

significant

The

lack of

relationships

for alternative

hypotheses.

the different performance measures

information.
at

relationships

and market measures
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of

between prior ROA
risk.

Only the

debt

to assets

ratio bears

both

groups

firms,

both.

of

Obviously,

denominators,
across
debt,

but

A high

4-3

Overall,
nearly

and

nine

so,

soundness

with

4-2,

H]a:
to

from 1982 to

are

significant,

firms.

This

are not

is

ROA
In

for

group

Table

was

a mixed

quality of management was

develop,

for both

however,

six are

groups

for

of

firms.
for

hypothesis

significantly

related

2.

4-4 are

results

of ANOVA's with

1982 only,

variables

the

independent variable.

ROA as

to a more proximate

time period,

corporate and
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as

subsequent

for

significant:

keep

significant only

result
not

Financial

and

reputation measures,
and

as

hypothesis.

significant.

attract,

significant

subsequent

especially compared to

relationships

are

likely.

1984,

first

Quality of management,
1

is

the

ability to

or by

of ANOVA's with

results,

reduce

relationship

support

talented people

group

inverse

for

stable

earnings

debt to assets

averaged

and only three
and

an

for

have common

could be used to

results

The

significant

relatively

retained

Thus

contains

dependent variables.
4-1

highly

relationship

debt to assets

subsequent

reputation measures,

Tables

is

return

new equity.

ROA and

Table

it

ROA and

financing assets

between

significant

and assets would be

periods.

attracting

a

more

social

dependent

results

Limited
become

responsibility and

average quality are now also significantly related to ROA
for both groups.
So,

experts'

subjective evaluations of performance

are significantly related to prior ROA while objective
measures except the debt to assets
are not.

This

ratio and ROA itself

is an important result,

supporting the

first hypothesis.
Prior Total

Stock Return.

Tables 4-5,

4-6,

4-7,

and

4-8 contain results of ANOVA's with classification of
firms by prior market performance:
total

z-score of average

stock return for 1977-1981.

In Tables 4-5 and 4-6,
risk measures

none of the performance or

is significantly related for both groups,

and only standard deviation of total

stock return is

significant for one group.
In Tables 4-7 and 4-8 reputation is considered as a
subsequent measure.

The results are rather strange,

frequently significant for group 1 and not for group 2.
From the group 1
infer experts'

results,

it would have been easy to

lagged perception of corporate attributes

from prior stock performance.

Instead one is lead to

conclude that the matched groups are different in this
respect.
equal

Recalling that the groups were matched for

representation of industries,

industry,

and within each

by average quality of management,
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it is

difficult to imagine random allocation of 98 firms would
result in such a consistent difference,
The results,
or fail

therefore,

cannot be said to clearly support

to support the hypothesis.

appear to support it,

but it has.

Group 1

and group 2 results do not.

specific hypothesis Hi& was not supported,
term investment was
1

results
The

in that long

significantly related only for group

firms.

Simple Regression
Prior Total

Stock Return.

Table 4-9 evaluates the

significance of selected measures of risk and quality of
management,

in simple regressions,

variation in prior total
beta,

to explain the

stock return.

the measure of systematic risk,

related,

Only average
is

significantly

and then only for group 1.

Prior R0A.

Table 4-10 looks at the relationships

between the selected measures and prior ROA.
residuals
Residual

is

Only

significant for both groups of firms.

error measures the firm's unsystematic risk.

The correlation coefficient,
Apparently,

is negative.

risky firms were the ones with higher ROA in

the prior period.

Average quality of management is

significant for group 1,
for group 2.

simple r,

and average beta is

These results
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fail

significant

to support the first

hypothesis,

and instead support an alternate hypothesis,

that only residuals

is

strongly related to prior

strategic performance.
Prior Quality of Management.
of management for 1982 is

In Table 4-11,

quality

the dependent variable,

and

only averaged quality of management 1982-1984 is
significant,

but this

is nearly an identity.

It is

notable that the other independent variables are not

significant.

Stepwise Regression
Prior Total

Stock Return.

In Table 4-12,

prior total

stock return is again considered as the dependent
variable,

but with the selected subsequent measures as

independent variables
be seen that,

in a stepwise regression.

for group 1,

It can

both beta and residuals are

significant, meaning the contribution of each to
explained variation in the dependent variable was
sufficient,

so that it is unlikely that the sample came

from a population in which its
zero.

For group 1,

regression coefficient was

residuals adds substantially to beta

in explaining the variation in prior stock return.
follows
However,

This

from the definition of the market model.
for group two,

the average standard deviation of
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income was entered first,

and neither beta nor residuals

is a significant predictor.
The group 2 result may not be so different from group
1 as

it first appears.

It is possible that standard

deviation of income measures a similar risk effect as the
combination of beta and residuals.
deviation of income enters first,

When standard
it may remove much of

the variation that beta and residuals would have
explained.

This could be tested in the future by forcing

the prior inclusion of beta and residuals for group 2.
For the first group,
significant,
total

the overall

regression is

and explains nearly 20% of the variation in

stock return.

For the second group,

the overall

regression is not significant.
Prior RQA.

In Table 4-13,

prior ROA is the dependent

variable in a stepwise regression.

As before in table 10,

results are different for the two groups,
inconclusive.

For group 1,

explanatory variable,

and

residuals is the best

with quality of management adding
2

substantially to reach an unadjusted R
second step.

of .319 in the

The group 2 results are quite different,

with beta the first and only independent variable
significantly related to ROA.

The results obtained are

not consistent enough to permit one to reject the null
hypotheses,

that there is no relationship of the
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independent variables to prior ROA.

However,

both
2

overall
of

regressions are significant, with adjusted R

.315 and

.156.

The full

's

set of explanatory variables,

quality of management and risk measures,

together account

for a significant amount of the variation in prior ROA.

Stepwise Regression:

Industrial

and Non-Industrial

Groups

Tables 4-14 and 4-15 consider the same stepwise
regressions,

with the two groups of 49 firms further

divided into subgroups of 39 industrial
industrial
results
4-9.

firms.

These tables also provide the overall

for the groups,

as they were reported in Table

The division of firms

industrial

and 10 non¬

into industrial

and non¬

firms was undertaken to determine whether

there were industry specific differences with respect to
Hi,

H^.

and H^.

H^

is considered next and H ^ and H ^ are

considered in later sections.
Prior Total

Stock Return.

Prior total

stock return

is the dependent variable in the regression results
presented in Table 4-14,
independent variables.

with subsequent measures as
None of the independent variables

is consistently significant across groups of firms.
overall

The

regressions are significant for both groups of

industrial

firms,

however.
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Prior R0A.
variable,

In Table 4-15,

prior ROA is the dependent

with the selected risk measures and quality of

management as explanatory variables.

Here,

results were

significant for residuals,

quality of management,

beta,

industrial

but only for group 1

group 2 industrial

firms,

firms only for beta.

and

and for

The overall

regressions were significant only because of the
significance of relationships among variables for
industrial

firms.

Stepwise results by industrial

group do not

consistently support the first hypothesis,

since the

reputation measure,

is not

quality of management,

significant across both groups of firms

in explaining

prior performance.

Stepwise Regression With Marginal

Quality of Management

In Tables 4-16 to 4-18 are presented the results of
stepwise regressions as

in Tables 4-12 and 4-13,

a new variable, marginal
equation

(5),

page 69,

but with

quality of management from

substituted for quality of

management.
P r i o r ROA.

Marginal

quality of management does not

emerge as a significant predictor of ROA in the stepwise
regression presented in Table 4-16.
regression

is

However,

significant for both groups,
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the overall

with adjusted

R2 of .229 for the first group and .143 for group 2.
set of risk measures and marginal

The

quality of management

together account for a significant portion of the
variation in prior ROA.

The simple correlations are all

negative,

except for standard deviation of income for

group 2.

A likely explanation is that a high ROA in one

period may somewhat reduce risk in a subsequent period:
there are additional
Prior Total

assets available for eventualities.

Stock Return.

In Table 4-17, prior total

stock return is the dependent variable.

None of the

explanatory varibles are significant for both groups of
firms.

The simple R between marginal

management and total

quality of

stock return is negative,

suggesting

that a perceived improvement in quality of management may
be associated with low prior total

stock return.

The result is that the new variable, marginal
of management,

quality

is also unable to support the first

hypothesis as bearing a strong relationship to prior
objective measures of performance.
Prior Quality of Management.

By contrast, there is a

highly significant negative relationship between marginal
quality of management and quality of management for 1982,
as reported in Table 4-18.
marginal

For both groups of firms,

quality of management was entered first,

simple correlation is negative at more than .5.
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and the
This may

be an important result.

It means that firms perceived as

having high quality of management in 1982 would be most
likely to suffer declines in that perception, and firms
with low perceived quality would be seen as improving
over the following two year period.

This apparent effect

could be partly an artifact of the tendency for extreme
cases to drift toward the mean in subsequent
observations.

It likely also involves actual

dynamics of

perception: a manager perceived as performing poorly in
1982 may be subsequently credited with resulting high
performance.

We may be most willing to attribute high or

low quality of management when we notice a change.

The

2

overall

regressions were significant, with R

of .29 and

.39 for the two groups.

Hypothesis Two: Subsequent Objective Measures
H ~:
Corporate Reputation is significantly
related to subsequent strategic performance.
To evaluate H 2, the significance of relationships
between reputation and subsequent accounting and stock
market performance is tested, as is the significance of
relationships between subsequent performance and various
other measures of risk and performance.
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ANOVA
Subseaent ROA.

In Tables 4-19 through 4-21 are

presented results of ANOVA's with classification of firms
into portfolios by subsequent accounting performance: zscore of average ROA for 1982-1984.

In Tables 4-19, 4-

20, and 21, prior measures of reputation, performance,
and risk,

respectively, are the independent variables.

Table 4-19 contains results of ANOVA's with
reputation measures from 1982 only.
previous surveys,

Since there were no

this represents "prior" reputation in

relation to ROA averaged from 1982 to 1984.

Use of

corporate assets and average quality are significant for
both groups.

"Use of corporate assets" could be taken as

approximately synonymous with "ROA."

Five other

reputation variables were significant for only one or the
other of the two groups usually group 2.
In Table 4-20, the only significant relationship is
that between subsequent ROA averaged from 1982 to 1984,
and ROA averaged from 1977 to 1981.
significant for both groups of firms.

This was highly
Again, apparently

only ROA among performance measures is related to ROA in
another time period.
reliability of ROA.
will

This is an indication of the
It may also indicate that managers

use accounting discretion to maintain an image of

steady performance, and that conditions influencing ROA
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may be fairly stable.

The remaining performance measures

are not related to ROA.
The lack of a relationship with average assets
indicates the lack of a simple returns to scale effect.
Larger firms

in this time frame were not assured a

subsequent higher return on their larger assets.
Similarly,
income,

growth,

whether in sales,

assets,

or operating

did not ensure a subsequent higher ROA.

One

would expect the performance of a firm to be a
continuation of its prior performance,
supported here,

but this

is not

except specifically with regard to ROA

itself.
Table 4-21

looks at relationships between subsequent

ROA and accounting and market measures of risk.
debt to assets

Only the

ratio bears a significant relationship,

and then only for group 2.

Again,

the absence of other

significant relationships

is perhaps more important:

firms grouped by ROA will

not be significantly different

with regard to either prior or subsequent measures of

risk.
The results tend to support hypothesis 2 with regard
to subasequent ROA,
Subsequent Total

albeit not strongly.
Stock Return.

Tables 4-22 through

4-24 contain results of ANOVA's with classification of
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firms

into portfolios by subsequent market performance:

z-score of average total
Remarkably,

stock return,

1982-1984.

none of the dependent variables are

significantly related for both groups.
significant only for group 1.

ROA is

The second hypothesis

not supported with respect to total

is

stock return.

Reputation is not related to subsequent market
performance of the firm.

This appears to be a strong

rejection of the many possible relationships that might
be hypothesized as predictions of total

stock return:

an

important negative result.

Simple Regression
Subsequent Total

Stock Return.

The results of simple

regressions evaluating H 2 are in Tables 4-25 to 4-27.
Table 4-25,

none of the independent variables was a

significant predictor of total
groups.

In

stock return for both

Thus hypothesis H 2 a is not supported.

Subsequent ROA.

In Table 4-26 are results of simple

regressions with ROA as the dependent variable.

Prior

quality of management and prior beta are significant
predictors

for both groups.

support for hypothesis H2b:
significant predictor of ROA.
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This suggests qualified
Quality of management is a
Though beta is

significant, quality of management has a slightly higher
probability.
Subsequent Quality of Management.

Quality of

management is the dependent variable in Table 4-27, and
only prior quality of management is a significant
predictor, which is to be expected,

since one measure is

embedded in the other.
In sum,

the simple regressions indicate that none of

the independent variables is significantly related to
either stock return or quality of management, except
prior quality of management.

About 10% of the variation

in ROA was explained by either prior quality of
management or by prior beta.

Thus, the second hypothesis

is supported by simple regressions, but only with respect
to ROA.

Stepwise Regression
Subsequent Total

Stock Return.

Subsequent total

stock return is the dependent variable presented in a
stepwise regression in Table 4-28.

For the first group,

averaged residuals for the period 1977-1981 entered
first, and was significant, meaning that it is unlikely
2

that the sample was drawn from a population in which R
or, equivalently, beta, equals

zero.

In group 1,

averaged stock beta for the same period entered second,
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and was also significant.

Interestingly, average beta

has a negative relationship with subsequent stock return,
once the effect of average residuals has been taken into
account.

The results for group 2 are

however.

None of them are significant, and the order of

inclusion is different.

The overall

quite different,

regression is

significant for group one, explaining nearly 25% of the
variation in the independent variable, but not at all
significant for group two.
Subsequent ROA.

The second equation considered

averaged ROA for 1982 to 1984 as the dependent variable,
with the same prior measures as independent variables.
The result, presented in Table 4-29 matches the
4

corresponding simple regression analysis in Table 4-26 in
that prior quality of management is a significant
predictor of ROA for both groups of firms.
the simple regressions,

Compared to

in which beta is a significant

independent variable for both groups of firms,

it has

become more significant for group 1 and insignificant for
group 2.
all

Both overall

regressions are significant when

four independent variables are included, but explain

only about 20% of the variation in ROA.

This result adds

support to the second hypothesis, and suggests that beta
adds to quality of management as a predictor of
subsequent ROA only for group 2.
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Thus, specific hypothesis H2c is only slightly
2

supported: adjusted R

for the stepwise regression

combining quality of management and risk measures is .191
for group 1, and .216 for group 2, compared to the
2

highest R

of .143 for simple regressions using the same

variables.
Stepwise Regression:

Industrial

and Non-Industrial Groups

Tables 4-30 and 4-31 consider the same stepwise
regressions, with the two groups of 49 firms further
divided into subgroups of 39 industrial
industrial

firms.

and 10 non¬

These tables also provide the overall

results for the groups, as they were reported in Table
4-9, above.
Subsequent Total

Stock Return.

Total

the dependent variable in Table 4-30.

stock return is

The only

independent variable found consistently significant is
averaged prior residuals for both groups of industrial
firms.

Again,

residual

error measures the firm's

unsystematic risk, and apparently,

risky firms were the

ones with higher subsequent stock returns.
two groups of non-industrial

Between the

firms, the sign of the

correlation coefficient, simple R,

reverses, being

positive for group 1 and negative for group 2.
overall

The

regression is not significant for group 2 firms
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because of the non-industrial
otherwise,

the overall

Subsequent RQA.
industrial

firms among them:

regressions are all

Separating industrial

significant.
and non¬

firms with ROA as the dependent variable

yields more specific results than were obtained in the
correspond!* ng overall

regression.

Table 4-31 shows that

prior quality of management and beta are significant
predictors for both groups of industrial

firms.

Quality

of management is not significant for either group of non¬
industrial

firms,

non-industrial

and beta is not significant for group 1

firms.

None of the remaining independent

variables were found significant.

This suggests a

possible increase in precision for the second hypothesis,
specifying a relationship to ROA for industrial

firms

only.

Hypothesis Three: Contemporaneous Objective Measures
H3:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to contemporaneous strategic
performance.
To evaluate H3, the significance of relationships
between reputation and contemporaneous accounting and
stock market performance is tested,

as is the

significance of relationships between contemporanous
performance and various other measures of risk and
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performance.

Results for relationships among all

performance measures are presented first.

ANOVA
Contemporaneous ROA.

In Tables 4-32, 4-34, and 4-36,

firms were grouped into ten "portfolios" by the Z-scores
of their average ROA's for the period 1982 to 1984.
Tables 4-33 and 4-35 were similarly based on ROA for the
period 1977 to 1981.
Table 4-32 contains the results of seven "ONEWAY"
ANOVA's representing contemporaneous market and
accounting performance measures.

Total

stock return was

not found to be significantly related to ROA.
significant for both groups,

however.

This is not

surprising in that ROA is based on net income,
net income will

Alpha was

reported

influence stock price, and net income is

used to pay dividends.

So a company's own ROA could be

expected to be related to its excess return.

Thus,

excess return reflects a firm's distinctive performance,
while total

stock return would dilute this distinctive

effect by incorporating general market movements.

A

check on these relationships for another time period,
1977 to 1981,
this period,

is provided in Table 4-33.

However,

in

a significant relationship did not exist.
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Also notable for their lack of significant
relationships with ROA,
average assets,

in either time period, were

sales growth, assets growth, and

operating income growth.
The significant relationship between ROA as an
independent variable and ROA as a dependent variable is
an artifact:
same data.

they represent the same time period and the
This result is included to demonstrate the

integrity of the analysis.

Similar results are included

for ROA in Table 4-32 and 4-33, and for total

stock

return in 4-37,and 4-40.
Among contemporaneous risk measures presented in
Table 4-34, only beta was significantly related to ROA
for both groups of firms.

Beta is a stock's systematic,

non-diversifiable market risk.

A significant

relationship between beta and ROA could mean either that
firms whose stocks move with the market are likely to be
more profitable, or the opposite, that firms whose stocks
have low betas and move oppositely to the market are more
profitable.

This effect would likely depend on the

direction of movement of the market as a whole in a
period, and was not observed for the period 1977 to 1981,
as presented in Table 4-35.
Again noteworthy are the variables that might have
had significant relationships, but did not.
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For the 1982

to 1984 period, the relationship to standard deviation of
total

stock return, a measure of a stock's total

was highly significant for group 2:
significant for group 1:
that the two groups,

.126.

risk,

.000, but not

This points out the fact

though randomly selected, and

matched by industries and by average quality of
management,

are not necessarily equivalent, and a

relationship that is not significant for both groups is
less likely to be observed among other groups of firms or
other time periods.

Similarly, among contemporaneous

accounting risk measures,

ROA and the debt to assets

ratio were significantly related for group 2:
not for group 1:

.494.

.024, but

At least this is consistent with

the previous distinction between the groups: many
relationships were significant for group 1 firms and not
for group 2.

The remaining risk measures,

standard

deviation of operating income, and operating leverage, do
not bear significant relationships to ROA.
Looking at the period 1977 to 1981,

in Table 4-35,

the debt to assets ratio bears a highly significant
relation to ROA for both groups.

One obvious reason for

the debt to assets ratio to be related to return on
assets is that the two variables have a common
denominator.

This is true for the significant

relationship found for group 1 in Table 34 as well
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as for

the same relationship found for both groups in Table 35.
A further possibility is that greater leverage, a
specific measure of risk,
return on assets.

is associated with higher

In sum,

neither market nor accounting

measures of risk, with the possible exception of the debt
to assets ratio, are reliably associated with ROA in the
same period.
The relationships between ROA and contemporaneous
measures of reputation are presented in Table 36.
1982 to 1984 period,

In the

fourteen of the possible

relationships are significant, and the remaining four are
nearly so.

This remarkable result indicates that in

considering three-year average contemporaneous measures,
reputation is much more consistently related to ROA than
are either market or accounting measures.

Using three

year averages does allow some influence of prior ROA on
reputation and conversely.
In conclusion,

ROA is frequently related to various

measures of reputation.

Among the measures of

reputation, only innovation consistently lacked a
significant relationship.

Alpha and beta were

significantly related to ROA only within the 1982 to 1984
time period.

Debt to assets was significantly related as

a subsequent measure, and as a contemporaneous measure in
1977 to 1981 only.
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It is notable that reputation is more frequently and
more closely related to contemporaneous than to prior or
subsequent ROA.
Contemporaneous Total
through 4-39,

Stock Return.

firms were grouped into ten "portfolios" by

the z-scores of their average total
period 1982 to 1984.
based on total

In Tables 4-37

stock returns for the

Tables 4-40 and 4-41 were similarly

stock return for the period 1977 to 1981.

Table 4-39 indicates a surprising lack of
relationship between total

stock return and

contemporaneous measures of reputation.
not supported.

Hypothesis 3 is

This important result is in contrast to

the frequent significance of relationships between
reputation and ROA reported above.
reputation,
to total

Prior measures of

reported in Table 4-24 also lack relationship

stock return.

Apparently,

experts perceptions

of a firm are more closely based on ROA than on stock
return.
Table 4-37 contains the results with contemporaneous
market and accounting performance measures as independent
variables.

The F ratios for alpha are lower, but still

highly significant,

simply because alpha is a component

of the classification variable.

None of the accounting

measures of performance are significantly related to
total

stock return for both groups of firms, a surprising
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result.

The same result was obtained for the time period

1977 to 1981, as indicated in Table 4-40.
interesting to note,

in tables 37 and 40,

It is
that in the

four instances in which the relationship is significant
for one group but not for the other,

it is group 1 which

is significant.
Contemporaneous risk measures are considered as
independent variables for the two time periods in Tables
4-38 and 4-41.

Noteworthy is the lack of significant

relationships, except for market risk measures in the
1977 to 1981 time period.
total

It may be that firms with high

stock returns tended

to have either more or less

risk associated with those returns in that period.

Stepwise Regression with Marginal
Contemporaneous Total

Stock Return.

the dependent variable is total
Contemporaneous marginal

Quality of Management
In Table 4-42,

stock return.

quality of management is a

significant explanatory variable for both groups of
firms,
total

accounting for more than 20% of the variation in
stock return.

This is another important result.

The correlation between marginal
and total
additional

quality of management

stock return is about .5 for both firms.

The

independent variables, prior measures of risk,

are not significant for both groups.
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Contemporaneous ROA.

Marginal

quality of management

does not emerge as a significant predictor of ROA in the
stepwise regression presented in Table 4-43.
beta is significant,

Only prior

as was found in the simple

regression of Table 4-26.
Contemporaneous Average Quality of Management.
Perhaps surprisingly, marginal
not emerge as

quality of management did

significant in relation to average quality

of management for the period 1982-1984, as reported in
Table 4-44.
It is remarkable that H3 is supported with respect to
marginal

quality of management and total

stock return

when other reputation measures are more related to ROA.
A possible explanation of this is that a change in
quality of management has a "figure-ground" effect on
investors: they notice a change in progress and
continuously revise their expectations.

Furthermore, a

change in management may have a delayed effect
anticipated by investors,

reflected in stock return

immediately but not reflected immediately in ROA.

Hypothesis Four: Correlation of Reputation Measures
H4:
The various dimensions of corporate
reputation are highly correlated.
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Correlation
To evaluate hypothesis H4, correlations among the
eight dimensions of management
For this purpose,
analyzed,

quality were examined.

five years of Fortune data were

including 1982 through 1986.

presented in Table 4-45,

The results,

indicate the high degree of

interrelation among these dimensions.

The eight

variables had an average correlation of .75.
variable,

social

responsibility,

lower average correlation,
attribution of social
the other attributes.

.58.

Only one

had a significantly
Apparently the

responsibility is less related to
The highest correlation,

.93, was

found between quality of management and use of corporate
assets.

This suggests a strong halo effect: that experts

are influenced by one or a few of the characteristics of
an organization and infer similar performance on a
variety of dimensions.
Even though the various dimensions of reputation are
highly correlated,

there were different results when each

is considered in relation to performance using ANOVA's.
This is due to the sensitivity of ANOVA,
above under ANOVA in Chapter III.
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as described

TABLE 4-1
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Performance Measures.
Independent Variable: Prior Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p < .01

* pf .05

115

F Prob.

1.026
1.138

0.437
0.361

1.483
1.272

0.189
0.283

5.528
5.189

0.000
0.000

1.029
1.412

0.435
0.217

1.165
1.131

0.344
0.365

1.602
0.682

0.149
0.721

1.251
1.173

0.294
0.339

TABLE 4-2
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Risk Measures.
Independent Variables: Prior Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p

<

.01

* Pi .05
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Prob.

0.481
1.594

0.879
0.151

1.015
2.224

0.445
0.041

5.686
4.324

0.000
0.001

0.985
1.018

0.467
0.443

1.231
0.946

0.305
0.498

**
**

TABLE 4-3
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Reputation Measures.
Independent Variable: Prior Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p * .01

* p 5 .05
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F Prob.

3.078
0.836

0.007 **
0.588

2.039
2.306

0.061
0.035 *

1.353
1.714

0.243
0.119

3.101
1.085

0.007 **
0.394

2.702
2.184

0.015 *
0.045 *

2.970
2.220

0.009 **
0.042 *

1.961
4.637

0.071
0.000 **

3.259
1.537

0.005 **
0.169

3.062
1.933

0.007 **
0.075

TABLE 4-4
ANOVA: Prior ROA with Reputation Measures.
Independent Variables: Prior Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p

5

.01

* p ^ .05
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Prob.

3.335
0.901

0.004
0.533

2.160
1.683

0.047
0.126

1.722
1.524

0.117
0.174

3.031
1.188

0.008
0.330

2.890
3.355

0.010

3.459
2.549

0.003

2.827
4.446

0.012

2.893
1.561

0.010

3.544
2.143

0.003
0.049

0.004

0.021

0.001

0.161

TABLE 4-5
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Performance Measures.
Independent Variables: Prior Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p

.01

* p 5 .05
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F Prob.

0.799
0.627

0.619
0.766

0.923
0.670

0.516
0.731

1.068
0.447

0.407
0.900

0.920
0.664

0.518
0.736

1.334
0.883

0.252
0.549

1.299
0.578

0.269
0.807

1.366
0.542

0.237
0.834

TABLE 4-6
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Risk Measures
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p < .01

* pf .05
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F Prob.

1.884
0.189

0.084
0.994

2.195
0.404

0.044 *
0.925

1.079
1.676

0.399
0.128

1.533
0.834

0.171
0.589

0.610
0.843

0.781
0.582

TABLE 4-7
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Reputation Measures.
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982-1984 Averages
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p i .01

* pi .05
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F Prob.

1.895
0.917

0.082
0.521

2.764
1.072

0.013
0.404

1.651
0.642

0.135
0.754

2.144
0.950

0.049
0.495

1.666
1.134

0.131
0.363

2.163
1.176

0.047
0.337

1.206
0.714

0.319
0.693

1.918
1.370

0.078
0.235

2.044
1.065

0.060
0.410

TABLE 4-8
ANOVA: Prior Total Stock Return with Reputation.
Independent Variable: Prior Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982
Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p £ .01

* p £ .05
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F Prob.

3.777
0.940

0.002
0.503

3.518
0.999

0.003
0.457

2.534
0.628

0.021
0.766

3.019
0.980

0.008
0.471

2.955
1.056

0.009
0.415

3.299
1.036

0.004
0.430

1.501
0.824

0.182
0.598

3.391
1.471

0.004
0.193

3.532
1.028

0.003
0.436

TABLE 4-9
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984
2
riable
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p £ .01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

4.338
0.529

0.043 *
0.471

0.085
0.011

0.291
0.105

3.123
4.028

0.084
0.051

0.062
0.079

-0.250
-0.281

2.238
0.650

0.141
0.424

0.045
0.014

0.213
0.117

0.637
0.037

0.429
0.847

0.013
0.001

-0.142
-0.028

* pi .05
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TABLE 4-10
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets,
1977-1981
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984
2
riable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p £ .01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

12.789
4.870

0.001
0.032 *

0.214
0.094

-0.462
-0.306

6.183
2.420

0.017 *
0.127

0.116
0.049

0.341
0.221

0.165
8.726

0.686
0.005 **

0.004
0.157

-0.059
-0.396

0.426
0.168

0.517
0.683

0.009
0.004

-0.095
0.060

* P £ .05
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TABLE 4-11
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Prior Quality of Management
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Quality of Management,
1982
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984
2
Variable
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p

*

.01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

0.000 **
0.000 **

0.782
0.754

0.884
0.869

2.164
1.698

0.148
0.199

0.044
0.035

0.210
-0.187

0.781
1.586

0.381
0.214

0.016
0.033

-0.128
0.181

0.335
1.360

0.565
0.249

0.007
0.028

-0.084
-0.168

168.802
144.321

* pf .05
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TABLE 4-12
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management
1982-1984
2
Variable
F
Signif.
Mult. R
R
Simple R
Avg. Beta
0.291
Group 1:
4.338
0.043 *
0.085
0.291
Group 2:
0.854
0.360
0.373
0.139
0.105
Avg. Residuals
0.447
-0.116
Group 1:
0.199
6.602
0.013 *
Group 2:
F- level insufficient, not entered in equation.
Avg. S.D. of Income
-0.250
0.485
0.235
Group 1:
2.089
0.155
-0.281
0.079
0.281
Group 2:
4.028
0.051
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
0.213
0.261
0.511
1.583
0.215
Group 1:
0.117
0.123
0.351
2.305
0.136
Group 2:
2
F

Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p

.01

* p

3.895
2.426

0.194
0.082

±

.05
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Signif.
0.000
0.070

TABLE 4-13
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets,
1977-1981
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984
2
Variable
F
Signif.
Mult. R
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
12.789
0.001 **
0.462
Group 2:
0.444
2.333
0.134
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
7.079
0.011 *
0.565
Group 2:
0.634
0.430
0.457
Avg. Beta
2.771
0.599
Group 1:
0.103
0.396
Group 2:
8.726
0.005 **
Avg. S.D. of Income
0.606
0.437
0.616
Group 1:
Group 2:
F- level or tolerance insuffient

R

Simple R

0.214
0.197

-0.462
-0.306

0.319
0.208

0.341
0.221

0.358
0.157

-0.059
-0.396

-0.095
0.367
to enter

2
F

Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:
** p ^ .01

6.381
3.950

0.315
0.156

* p< .05
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Signif.
0.000
0.010

**
**

TABLE 4-14
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return, 1977-1981

Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984

2
Variable
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

F

Sign if.
0.043 *
0.059
0.393

4.338
3.793
0.872

Mult. R
0.291
0.305
0.709

R
0.085
0.093
0.503

Simple R
0.291
0.305
0.265

0.139
0.105
0.373
0.854
0.360
Group 2:
Industrial
F- level 'insufficient, not entered in (squation
0.377
0.251
0.614
0.179
0.690
Non-industrial
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.013 *
0.008 **
0.600

6.602
7.773
0.306

0.447
0.504
0.645

0.199
0.254
0.416

-0.116
-0.175
0.236

Group 2:
F-•1 evel insufficient, not entered in <equation.
0.118
0.203
0.451
0.238
1.439
Industrial
-0.186
0.354
0.595
0.606
Non-industrial
0.296
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

2.089
1.091
0.745

0.155
0.303
0.417

0.485
0.526
0.622

0.235
0.277
0.386

-0.250
-0.259
-0.182

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

4.028
6.266
0.345

0.051
0.017 *
0.575

0.281
0.381
0.568

0.079
0.145
0.323

-0.281
-0.381

0.220
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TABLE 4-14: (continued).
2
F

Variable
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial
Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

Signif.

Mult. R

1.583
0.580
3.781

0.215
0.452
0.088

0.511
0.537
0.567

0.261
0.289
0.321

0.213
0.174
0.567

2.305

0.136
0.299
0.109

0.351
0.413
0.538

0.123
0.170
0.289

0.117
0.029
0.538

1.110
3.254

R

Simple R

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial
Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

** p £ .01

F

Signif.

0.194
0.205
0.105

3.895
3.450
1.264

0.000
0.010

0.082
0.135

2.426
2.975
0.755

0.070
0.040
0.590

0.000

* pi .05
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0.390

TABLE 4-15
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return on Assets,
1977-1981
Independent Variables: Risk Measures and Quality of Management,
1982-1984

2
Variable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

F

Signif.

0.001 **
0.000 **

12.789
17.931
0.155

0.706

Mult. R
0.462
0.571
0.580

R
0.214
0.326
0.337

Simple R
-0.462
-0.571
-0.144

Group 2:
0.134
0.444
0.197
-0.306
2.333
Industrial
F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter
-0.509
Non-industrial
0.509
0.259
2.793
0.133
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

7.079
9.250
0.034

0.011 *

0.004 **
0.861

0.565
0.681
0.626

0.319
0.464
0.392

0.341
0.439
-0.090

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.634
0.720
0.880

0.430
0.402
0.384

0.457
0.516
0.744

0.208
0.267
0.553

0.221

Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

2.771
7.720
0.499

0.103
0.009 **
0.506

0.599
0.749
0.623

0.358
0.561
0.388

-0.059
-0.009
-0.217

8.726
12.468

0.005 **
0.001 **

0.396
0.502
0.744

0.157
0.252
0.554

-0.396
-0.502
-0.407

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.012

0.916

0.272
0.086
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TABLE 4-15: (continued).
2
F
Signif.
Variable
Mult. R
Simple R
R
Avg. S.D. of Income
0.616
0.437
Group 1:
0.606
-0.095
0.367
F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter
Industrial
Non-industrial
3.798
0.087
0.567
-0.567
0.322
F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter
Group 2:
Industrial
F-level or tolerance insuffient to enter
Non-industrial
3.120
0.121
-0.458
0.698
0.487
2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.315
0.523

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

** p 5 .01

F

Signif.

0.000 **
0.000 **

0.000

6.381
14.907
0.805

0.156
0.226
0.197

3.950
6.547
1.552

0.010 **
0.004 **
0.310

* p 6 .05
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0.570

TABLE 4-16
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior ROA
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Return On Assets,
1977-81

Independent Variables: Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management,
1982-1984

2
F
Signif.
Variable
Mult. R
Avg. Residuals,1982--84
0.462
Group 1:
12.789
0.001 **
Group 2:
2.333
0.134
0.442
Avg. Beta,1982-84
0.523
Group 1:
0.379
0.058
0.396
0.005 **
Group 2:
8.726
Marginal Quality of Management
0.541
0.286
1.167
Group 1:
0.459
0.387
0.764
Group 2:
AVG. S.D. of Income,1982-84
0.541
0.815
0.055
Group 1:
0.463
0.653
0.205
Group 2:

R

Simple R

0.214
0.197

-0.462
-0.306

0.274
0.157

-0.059
-0.396

0.292
0.211

-0.241
-0.084

0.293
0.214

-0.095
0.060

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

* p

4.560
3.001

0.229
0.143

<

F

.05
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Signif.

0.000
0.020

TABLE 4-17
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.

Dependent Variable: Prior Average Total Stock Return
1977-81
Independent Variables: Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management
1982-1984

2
Variable
F
Signif.
Marginal Quality of Management
Group 1:
4.427
0.041 *
Group 2:
0.502
0.482
Avg. Beta
2.814
Group 1:
0.100
0.654
Group 2:
0.423
Avg. Residuals
0.033 *
4.867
Group 1:
0.385
Group 2:
0.769
AVG. S.D. of Income
0.261
1.298
Group 1:
0.051
4.028
Group 2:

Mult. R

R

Simple R

0.293
0.298

0.086
0.089

-0.293
-0.140

0.673
0.319

0.139
0.102

0.291
0.105

0.472
0.343

0.223
0.117

-0.116
-0.028

0.495
0.281

0.245
0.079

-0.250
-0.281

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

F
3.571
1.463

0.176
0.037

* p £ .05
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Signif.
0.010
0.230

TABLE 4-18
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Prior Quality of Management
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Prior Average Quality of Management
1982
Independent Variables: Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management
1982-1984

2
Variable
F
Signif.
Marginal Quality of Management
Group 1:
22.333
0.000
Group 2:
15.767
0.000
Avg. Beta,1982-84
Group 1:
0.459
0.502
Group 2:
0.017
0.898
Avg. Residuals,1982--84
Group 1:
0.916
0.344
Group 2:
8.785
0.005
AVG. S.D. of Income,1982-84
Group 1:
0.304
0.584
Group 2:
5.320
0.026

Mult. R
**
**

R

Simple R

0.568
0.501

0.322
0.251

-0.568
-0.501

0.573
0.662

0.329
0.438

0.210
-0.187

**

0.585
0.609

0.342
0.371

-0.084
-0.168

*

0.589
0.662

0.347
0.438

-0.128
0.181

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p 5 .01

F
5.838
8.571

0.287
0.387

* p 5 .05
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Signif.

0.000
0.000

**
**

TABLE 4-19
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Reputation Measures.

Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p 5 .01

* p i .05
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F Prob.

3.115
1.383

0.006
0.229

1.717
2.615

0.118
0.018

1.441
1.358

0.205
0.240

1.312
2.067

0.262
0.057

1.293
4.069

0.272
0.001

2.070
2.483

0.057
0.024

1.270
2.855

0.284
0.011

2.257
2.191

0.038
0.044

2.132
2.736

0.050
0.014

TABLE 4-20
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Performance Measures.

Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

* pf .05
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F Prob.

0.504
0.678

0.863
0.723

0.424
0.750

0.914
0.662

3.973
5.883

0.001

1.199
0.943

0.323
0.500

0.677
1.682

0.724
0.127

0.887
0.667

0.545
0.773

0.114
1.158

0.999
0.348

0.000

TABLE 4-21
ANOVA: Subsequent ROA with Risk Measures.

Independent Variable: Subsequent Accounting Performance,
*Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

0.801
2.074

0.617
0.056

1.049
1.572

0.420
0.158

0.778
2.505

0.637
0.023 *

1.878
0.679

0.085
0.723

0.688

0.715
0.140

1.632

* pi .05
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F Prob.

TABLE 4-22
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Performance Measures.

Independent Variables: Subsequent Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Market Measures:
A1 pha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p 6: .01

* p £ .05
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F Prob.

0.973
0.806

0.477
0.613

0.969
0.609

0.480
0.782

2.391
0.886

0.029
0.546

0.762
0.525

0.651
0.847

0.655
0.765

0.743
0.649

0.677
1.555

0.725
0.163

0.405
1.223

0.925
0.309

TABLE 4-23
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Risk Measures.

Independent Variables: Subsequent Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p

<

.01

* p

<

.05
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F Prob.

1.348
0.329

0.245
0.960

1.825
0.479

0.095
0.880

1.726
0.869

0.116
0.560

0.734
0.543

0.676
0.834

0.448
0.879

0.900
0.552

TABLE 4-24
ANOVA: Subsequent Total Stock Return with Reputation.

Independent Variable: Subsequent Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibi1ity
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

* pf .05
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F Prob.

1.073
0.438

0.404
0.906

0.964
0.304

0.484
0.969

1.184
0.538

0.332
0.838

1.256
0.367

0.291
0.944

0.951
0.464

0.494
0.890

0.936
0.387

0.505
0.934

1.607
1.637

0.147
0.139

0.845
0.346

0.580
0.953

1.068
0.335

0.407
0.958

TABLE 4-25
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return,
1982-1984

Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
riable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p < .01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

6.288
0.022

0.016 *
0.882

0.118

0.000

0.344
0.022

2.081
1.896

0.175
0.175

0.039
0.039

0.197
0.197

0.441
0.216

0.510
0.644

0.009
0.005

-0.096
-0.068

0.380
0.672

0.541
0.416

0.008
0.014

-0.090
-0.119

* p 5 .05
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TABLE 4-26
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.

Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets,
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
riable
Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

5.969
7.856

0.018 *
0.007 **

0.113
0.143

0.336
0.378

5.631
4.636

0.022 *
0.036 *

0.107
0.090

-0.327
-0.300

2.047
1.893

0.159
0.175

0.042
0.039

0.204
0.197

1.585
0.189

0.214
0.666

0.033
0.004

-0.181
-0.063

* p i .05
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TABLE 4-27
SIMPLE REGRESSION: Subsequent Quality of Management
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Quality of Management,
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures,1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
Variable
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p

<

.01

F

Signif.

R

Simple R

0.000 **
0.000 **

0.782
0.754

0.884
0.869

1.291
1.491

0.262
0.228

0.027
0.031

0.164
0.175

0.363
2.269

0.550
0.139

0.008
0.046

-0.088
-0.215

0.097
1.875

0.757
0.177

0.002
0.038

-0.045
-0.196

168.802
144.321

* p i .05

143

TABLE 4-28
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return,
1982-1984

Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
Variable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
F- 1
Group 2:

F

Signif.

Mult. R

R

Simple R

6.288
0.925

0.016 *
0.341

0.344
0.258

0.118
0.066

0.344
0.022

7.869
0.405

0.007 **
0.528

0.497
0.217

0.247
0.047

-0.090
0.119

2.177
1.896

0.147
0.175

0.531
0.197

0.282
0.039

0.206
0.197

evel insufficient, not entered in equation.
0.068
0.073
0.270
0.310
0.580

2
F

Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

5.880
0.865

0.234

0.000

* p < .05
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Signif.
0.002
0.490

TABLE 4-29
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets,
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
Variable
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Group 2:

F

Signif.

Mult. R

R

Simple R

5.969
7.856

0.018 *
0.007 **

0.336
0.378

0.113
0.143

0.336
0.378

7.076
3.470

0.011 *
0.069

0.481
0.451

0.231
0.203

-0.327
-0.300

1.292
0.909

0.262
0.346

0.502
0.530

0.252
0.281

0.204
0.197

0.342
3.859

0.562
0.056

0.508
0.516

0.258
0.266

-0.181
-0.063

2
F

Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p < .01

3.829
4.301

0.191
0.216

* pi .05
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Signif.

0.000
0.000

**
**

TABLE 4-30
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Total Stock Return, 1982-1984

Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
Variable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

6.288
6.183
0.681

0.016 *
0.018 *
0.433

0.344
0.378
0.280

0.118
0.143
0.078

0.344
0.378
0.280

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.925
4.587
7.195

0.341
0.039 *
0.028 *

0.258
0.332
0.688

0.066
0.110
0.474

0.022
0.332
-0.688

Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

7.869
1.402
10.839

0.007 **
0.244
0.013 *

0.497
0.513
0.799

0.247
0.264
0.638

-0.090
-0.004
-0.210

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.405
3.561
0.450

0.528
0.067
0.524

0.217
0.436
0.711

0.047
0.190
0.505

0.119
0.063
-0.507

Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

2.177
4.277
0.314

0.147
0.046 *
0.599

0.531
0.484
0.914

0.282
0.234
0.835

0.206
0.255
-0.138

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

1.896
1.444
0.088

0.175
0.238
0.777

0.197
0.472
0.716

0.039
0.222
0.512

0.197
0.224
0.086

F

Signif.

Mult. R

R

Simple R
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TABLE 4-30: (continued).
2
F
Signif.
Variable
Mult. R
R
Simple R
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
F-level 'insufficient. not entered in iequation.
Group 1:
0.163
Industrial
0.689
0.517
0. 267
-0.056
Non-industrial
6.391
0.045 *
0.908
0. 825
-0.258
0.310
0.321
0.084

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.580
0.575
0.784

0.270
0.479
0.721

0. 073
0. 230
0. 521

0.068
-0.104
0.089

2
Adjusted R

F

Signif.

Overall Regression
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.234
0.181
0.703

5.880
3.099
6.337

0.002
0.020
0.030

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.000
0.139
0.137

0.865
2.535
1.357

0.490
0.050
0.360

** p * .01

* p t .05
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TABLE 4-31
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Subsequent ROA
with Risk Measures and Quality of Management
-With Separate Results For
Industrial and Non-Industrial Firms.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Average Return on Assets,
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Quality of Management, 1982

2
Variable
Avg. Qual. of Mgt.
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

F
5.969
5.917
3.592

0.018 *
0.020 *
0.107

0.336
0.371
0.825

0.113
0.138
0.681

0.336
0.371
0.122

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

7.856
10.647
1.690

0.007 **
0.002 **
0.235

0.378
0.473
0.836

0.143
0.223
0.698

0.378
0.473
0.037

Avg. Beta
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

7.076
5.924
0.819

0.011 *
0.020 *
0.407

0.481
0.510
0.852

0.231
0.260
0.726

-0.327
-0.361
-0.415

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

3.470
5.615
13.365

0.069
0.024 *
0.006 **

0.451
0.616
0.791

0.203
0.379
0.626

-0.300
-0.260
-0.791

Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

1.292
1.241
2.202

0.262
0.273
0.181

0.502
0.560
0.700

0.252
0.314
0.490

0.204
0.241
-0.384

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.909
1.227
3.061

0.346
0.275
0.131

0.530
0.499
0.895

0.281
0.249
0.800

0.197
0.205
-0.493

Signif.

Mult. R

R

Simple R
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TABLE 4-31: (continued).
2
Variable
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial
Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

F

Signif.

Mult. R

0.342
1.440
3.926

0.562
0.238
0.083

0.508
0.538
0.574

0.258
0.289
0.329

-0.181
-0.122
-0.574

3.859
1.317
0.321

0.056
0.259
0.596

0.516
0.526
0.901

0.266
0.276
0.812

-0.063
0.039
-0.528

R

Simple R

2
Adjusted R

F

Signif.

Overall Regression
Group 1:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.191
0.233
0.506

3.829
3.890
3.307

0.000 **

Group 2:
Industrial
Non-industrial

0.216
0.306
0.662

4.301
5.184
5.410

0.000 **

** p 6 .01

* P £ .05
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0.010 **
0.110
0.002 **
0.040 *

TABLE 4-32
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance Measures.

Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
A1 pha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ± .01

* p < .05
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F Prob.

0.920
2.235

0.046
0.040

0.605
1.836

0.785
0.092

197.312
79.014

0.000
0.000

1.038
0.777

0.428
0.638

0.839
0.506

0.585
0.861

1.761
0.293

0.108
0.973

0.887
0.756

0.546
0.656

TABLE 4-33
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Performance Measures.

Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p < .01

* p ^ .05
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F Prob.

2.004
0.352

0.065
0.951

1.617
0.412

0.144
0.921

78.871
239.057

0.000
0.000

0.676
1.276

0.726
0.281

0.695
1.468

0.709
0.194

0.814
0.828

0.607
0.594

0.655
0.992

0.743
0.463

TABLE 4-34
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

* p i .05
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F Prob.

2.167
3.116

0.046 *
0.006 **

1.685
4.531

0.126

0.951
2.490

0.494
0.024 **

1.297
0.769

0.270
0.645

1.000
1.076

0.456
0.402

0.000 **

TABLE 4-35
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Risk Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

* p < .05
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F Prob.

0.464
1.543

0.890
0.168

1.401
1.679

0.221
0.127

3.699
5.726

0.002

**

0.000

**

0.971
1.418

0.478
0.214

0.954
1.735

0.492
0.114

TABLE 4-36
ANOVA: Contemporaneous ROA with Reputation Measures.

Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Accounting Performance,
Z-score of Avg. ROA, 1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibility
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p <■ .01

* P£ .05
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F Prob.

3.879
2.080

0.001
0.056

**

2.421
3.598

0.027
0.002

*

1.915
1.943

0.078
0.074

2.631
2.554

0.018
0.021

*

3.176
4.046

0.006
0.001

**

2.907
3.307

0.010
0.004

**

1.768
3.228

0.106
0.005

3.991
3.732

0.001
0.002

**

3.628
3.739

0.002
0.002

**

**

*

**

**

**

**

**

TABLE 4-37
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Performance Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £. .01

* p< .05
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F Prob.

16.565
14.023

0.000 **
0.000 **

23.136
111.611

0.000 **
0.000 **

1.330
1.163

0.254
0.345

0.920
0.482

0.519
0.878

3.252
1.361

0.005 **
0.239

2.366
0.695

0.031 *
0.709

1.384
1.155

0.229
0.350

TABLE 4-38
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p < .01

* pi .05
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F Prob.

0.977
0.257

0.474
0.982

1.170
0.805

0.340
0.614

1.998
0.178

0.066
0.995

0.822
0.789

0.600
0.628

0.780
1.110

0.636
0.379

2.366
0.695

0.031
0.709

1.384
1.155

0.229
0.350

TABLE 4-39
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Reputation Measures.

Independent Variable: Contemporaneous Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1982-1984
Dependent Variables: Reputation Measures,
1982-1984 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Quality of Management
Group 1:
Group 2:
Quality of Products
Group 1:
Group 2:
Innovation
Group 1:
Group 2:
Long Term Investment
Group 1:
Group 2:
Financial Soundness
Group 1:
Group 2:
Ability to Attract, Develop
and Keep Talented People
Group 1:
Group 2:
Corporate and Social
Responsibility
Group 1:
Group 2:
Use of Corporate Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Quality
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

* p ^ .05
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F Prob.

1.366
0.652

0.237
0.746

0.864
0.174

0.564
0.996

1.680
0.466

0.127
0.888

1.240
0.839

0.300
0.586

1.568
0.656

0.159
0.743

1.124
0.329

0.370
0.960

1.559
1.572

0.162
0.158

1.306
0.904

0.265
0.531

1.320
0.431

0.258
0.910

TABLE 4-40
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Performance Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Performance Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

F Ratio

Dependent Variables
Market Measures:
Alpha
Group 1:
Group 2:
Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:

22.453
56.400
23.732
150.326

Accounting Measures:
Return On Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Average Assets
Group 1:
Group 2:
Sales Growth
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p < .01

* p i .05

158

F Prob.

0.000
0.000

★★
★★

0.000 ★ ★
0.000 **

2.006
1.213

0.065
0.315

1.266
0.787

0.286
0.630

3.015
1.788

0.008 **
0.102

2.148
0.888

0.048
0.545

4.430
2.690

0.001
0.016 *

★

TABLE 4-41
ANOVA: Contemporaneous Total Stock Return with Risk Measures.

Independent Variables: Contemporaneous Market Performance,
Z-score of Avg. Total Stock Return,
1977-1981
Dependent Variables: Risk Measures,
1977-1981 Averages

Dependent Variables

F Ratio

Market Measures:
Beta
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Total Stock Return
Group 1:
Group 2:
Accounting Measures:
Debt to Assets Ratio
Group 1:
Group 2:
S.D. of Operating Income
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Leverage
Group 1:
Group 2:
Assets Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:
Operating Income Growth:
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

* p ^ .05
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F Prob.

2.388
1.787

0.029 *
0.102

2.183
2.512

0.045 *
0.023 *

0.844
0.979

0.581
0.472

1.006
0.757

0.452
0.655

1.016
1.395

0.444
0.224

2.366
0.695

0.031
0.709

1.384
1.155

0.229
0.350

TABLE 4-42
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Total Stock Return
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.

Dependent Variable: Average Total Stock Return
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Marginal Quality of Management
1982-1984

2
Variable
F
Signif.
Mult. R
Marginal Quality of Management
Group 1:
14.491
0.485
0.000 **
Group 2:
13.200
0.001 **
0.468
Avg. Residuals
Group 1:
4.859
0.033 *
0.556
Group 2:
0.265
0.609
0.502
Avg. Beta,
0.591
Group 1:
2.850
0.098
0.498
0.220
0.641
Group 2:
S.D. of Income
0.602
0.364
Group 1:
0.840
0.494
0.227
Group 2:
1.500

R

Simple R

0.236
0.219

0.485
0.468

0.309
0.252

0.344
0.022

0.350
0.248

-0.090
-0.119

0.362
0.244

0.206
0.197

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p 5 .01

F
6.242
3.708

0.304
0.184

* p £ .05
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Signif.

0.000
0.010

**

TABLE 4-43
STEPWISE REGRESSION: ROA
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.
Dependent Variable: Average Return On Assets,
1982-1984

Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981;
and Marginal Quality of Management,
1982-1984

2
Variable
F
Signif.
Mult. R
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
5.631
0.327
0.022 *
Group 2:
4.636
0.300
0.036 *
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
1.091
0.357
0.302
Group 2:
1.304
0.386
0.260 **
Marginal Quality of Management
Group 1:
0.181
0.673
0.362
0.387
Group 2:
0.011
0.918
Avg. Residuals
0.364
Group 1:
0.068
0.795
0.353
Group 2:
1.827
0.183

R

Simple R

0.107
0.090

-0.327
-0.300

0.128
0.149

0.204
0.197

0.131
0.149

0.050
0.052

0.133
0.125

-0.181
-0.063

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p ^ .01

F
1.680
1.932

0.054
0.073

* pi .05

161

Signif.
0.170
0.120

TABLE 4-44
STEPWISE REGRESSION: Quality of Management
with Risk Measures
and Marginal Quality of Management.

Dependent Variable: Average Quality of Management
1982-1984
Independent Variables: Risk Measures, 1977-1981
and Marginal Quality of Management
1982-1984

2
Variable
F
Signif.
Avg. S.D. of Income
Group 1:
1.291
0.262
Group 2:
1.055
0.310
Marginal Quality of Management
Group 1:
1.853
0.180
Group 2:
0.234
0.631
Avg. Beta
Group 1:
0.428
0.516
0.139
Group 2:
2.269
Avg. Residuals
0.538
Group 1:
0.385
0.690
Group 2:
0.162

Mult. R

R

Simple R

0.164
0.260

0.027
0.067

0.164
0.175

0.254
0.269

0.064
0.072

-0.143
-0.041

0.271
0.215

0.073
0.046

-0.088
-0.215

0.285
0.275

0.081
0.076

-0.045
-0.196

2
Adjusted R
Overall Regression
Group 1:
Group 2:

** p £ .01

F
0.973
0.900

0.000
0.000

* p ^ .05
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Signif.
0.430
0.470

TABLE 4-45
CORRELATION: Reputation Measures, 1982-1986.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Avg.
Corr.

1.Quality of
management

1.0

.775

.808

.882

.727

.891

.498

.927

.787

2. Quality of
product

.775

1.0

.765

.762

.652

.840

.674

.722

.741

3. Innovation

.808

.765

1.0

.732

.579

.835

.485

.763

.775

4. Long-term
investment
value

.882

.762

.732

1.0

.874

.914

.566

.897

.804

5. Financial
Soundness

.727

.652

.579

.874

1.0

.838

.631

.821

.732

6. Ability to
attract
people

.891

.840

.835

.914

.838

1.0

.657

.872

.835

7. Social
Responsi¬
bility

.498

.674

.485

.566

.631

.657

1.0

.522

.576

8. Use of Corp.
Assets

.927

.722

.763

.897

.821

.872

.522

1.0

.789

Overall
Average
Correlation

-754
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CHAPTER

SUMMARY,

CONCLUSIONS,

V

AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Summary

In the previous chapter,

and Tables 1

through 45,

detailed results were presented for each hypothesis.
Table 5-1,

these results are summarized according to

whether they support each hypothesis,

fail

or are mixed.

both general

specific,

In

All

of the hypotheses,

are presented in

Exhibit 2-1.

are summarized diagrammatical 1y in

to support it,
and

The hypotheses

Figure 2-1.

Hi:
Corporate reputation is significantly
related to prior strategic performance.

The general

hypothesis Hi was

supported by ANOVA's

which showed that dimensions of reputation were often
significantly related to prior ROA

(see Tables 4-3 and 4-

4) .
The results of ANOVA's testing H i with respect to
total

stock return were mixed:

relationships to

reputation were frequently significant for group 1 but
never for group 2

(Tables 4-5 to 4-8).

stepwise regressions

Simple and

failed to support H i with respect to
164

total

stock return:

the beta coefficients

quality of management to prior total

relating

stock return were

not significant.
Industry differences might have led to different
results

for industrial

respect to

H\.

and non-industrial

Stepwise regressions with the firms

separated into industrial
not support

groups with

and non-industrial

for either group

groups did

(Tables 4-14 and 4-15).

Neither did stepwise regressions with marginal
management

(Tables 4-16 to 18).

relationship was

quality of

A significant

found between marginal

management and quality of management,

quality of

1982,

however.

Hia:
Experts' perceptions of quality of
management are significantly related to prior
ROA.
In relation to the specific hypothesis Hia,

ANOVA,

and simple and stepwise regressions provided mixed
results:

the beta coefficients relating quality of

management to prior ROA were significant for group 1,
not for group 2

(Tables 4-3,

4-4,

4-10,

but

4-13).

Hib:
Experts' perceptions of long-term
investment value are significantly related to
prior total stock return.
Results were mixed for specific hypothesis Hib:
ANOVA's found a significant relationship between
perception of long-term investment value and total
return only for group 1

(Tables 4-7 and 4-8).
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stock

H2:
Corporate Reputation is significantly
related to subsequent strategic
performance.
Hypothesis H2 was
19 to 4-21),

supported by ANOVA's on ROA

but not as often as was H\.

(Tables

Several

reputation variables were significant in relation to
subsequent ROA,

and use of corporate assets and quality

of management were significant for both groups of firms.
As with prior ROA,

ROA among performance measures,

and

debt to assets among risk measures were significantly
related to subsequent ROA,

but debt to assets only for

group 2.
ANOVA's yielded mixed results
hypothesis with respect to total

in terms of the second
stock return: while

neither performance nor return measures were significant,
eight of nine reputation measures were significant,
only for group 1

(Tables 4-22 to 24).

difference between groups

but

The marked

in this regard is

intriguing.

Simple regressions supported H2 with regard to ROA:
only beta and quality of management were significant for
both groups

(Table 4-26).

Simple regressions on total

stock return yielded no significant predictors,
failing to support H2

(Table 4-25).

Separate stepwise results
industrial

however,

for industrial

and non¬

firms showed that the significance of beta and

quality of management in relation to ROA were
166

specifically for industrial

firms

(Table 4-31).

not supported with respect to subsequent total
return:
groups

only residuals was significant,
in the case of industrial

firms

H^ was
stock

and only for both
(Table 4-30).

Hpa:
Experts' perceptions of long term
investment value are significantly related to
subsequent total stock return.
Results of ANOVA failed to support H2

a

:

perception of

long term investment value was not significantly related
to total

stock return

H~, :
Experts'
management are
subsequent ROA
separately are

(Table 4-24).

perceptions of quality of
a significant predictor of
while prior risk measures
not.

Results of simple regression support H^.
average beta,

except that

the measure of systematic risk, was also a

significant predictor of subsequent ROA

(Table 4-26).

H2G:
A combination of selected dimensions of
prior reputation and risk explains more of the
variation in subsequent ROA than does prior
reputation or risk separately.
A comparison of simple and stepwise regressions
provides support for
indicates that beta,

(Table 4-26,

Table 4-29).

the measure of systematic risk,

It
is

relatively independent of quality of management as a
predictor,

remaining significant for group 1 and nearly

so for group 2,

and adding substantially to explanatory

2

power:

from R =.113 and

.143 for quality of management in
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simple regressions, to R =.231 and .203,

for stepwise

regressions adding beta to quality of management.
Furthermore, the relationship between beta and ROA was
found to be negative: greater risk meant lower return.
Comparable results with total

stock return as the

dependent variable were mixed (Table 4-28).
Hypothesis

was strongly supported by ANOVA with

ROA as the independent variable (Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-21,
and 4-36).

Reputation measures were much more often

significantly related to contemporaneous ROA than to
prior or subsequent ROA.

ANOVA based on total

stock

return failed to support the third hypothesis: none of
the contemporaneous reputation measures were
significantly related (Table 4-39).
In stepwise regression marginal

quality of management

was found to be a highly significant explanatory variable
in relation to total

stock return, and not in relation to

ROA, or even quality of management (Tables 4-42 to 44).
It is remarkable that marginal
related to total

quality of management was

stock return, when reputation measures

were otherwise related only to ROA.
The remaining hypothesis, H^, that the dimensions of
reputation would be highly

correlated, was confirmed for

all of the dimensions, with an average correlation
coefficient of .75 (Table 4-45).
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It was noted that the

average correlation for social

responsibility was lower,

at .58.
In sum, with a range of methods,

significant

relationships were found between reputation and
performance, but generally for ROA and not for total
stock return.

The relationships were strongest when the

performance and reputation measures were contemporaneous
three-year averages.

Correlation analysis showed that

the eight dimensions of reputation were themselves highly
interrelated.
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TABLE 5-1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS BY HYPOTHESIS
Hi:
Corporate reputation is significantly related to
prior strategic performance.
Supported
ANOVA:

Not
Supported

ROA

Mixed
ANOVA: Total
Stock Return
Simple and
Stepwise
Regression:

ROA

H]a:
Experts' perceptions of quality of management are
significantly related to prior ROA.
Supported

Not
Supported

Mixed
ANOVA, Simple,
and Stepwise: ROA

Hxb:
Experts' perceptions of long-term investment value
are significantly related to prior total stock return.

Supported

Not
Supported

Mixed
ANOVA: Total
Stock Return
(continued next page)
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TABLE 5-1

(continued).

H2:
Corporate Reputation is significantly related to
subsequent strategic performance.
Supported
ANOVA and Simple
Regression: ROA
Stepwise
Regression: ROA
for Industrial
Firms

Not
Supported

Mi xed

Simple and
Stepwise
Regression: Total
Stock Return
Stepwise
Regression: ROA
for Non-Industrial
Fi rms

H2a:
Experts' perceptions of long term investment value
are a significant predictor of subsequent total stock
retu rn.
Supported

Not
Supported
ANOVA: Total
Return

Mixed
Stock

H2b:
Experts' perceptions of quality of management are a
significant predictor of subsequent ROA while prior risk
measures and quality of management separately are not.
Supported

Not
Supported

Mixed

Simple Regression:
ROA
(continued next page)

171

TABLE 5-1

(continued)

H2c*
A combination of selected dimensions of prior
reputation and risk explains more of the variation in
subsequent ROA than does prior reputation or risk
separately.
Not
Supported

Supported
Simple and
Stepwise
Regressions:

Mixed

ROA

H3:
Corporate reputation is more often significantly
related to contemporaneous strategic performance than to
prior or subsequent strategic performance.
Supported
ANOVA:

ROA

Not
Supported
ANOVA: Total
Return

Mixed
Stock

ANOVA: Total Stock
Return -Marginal
Quality of
Management
H4:
The various dimensions of corporate reputation are
highly correlated.
Supported

Not
Supported

Correlation:
Reputation
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Mixed

Conclusions

The results of this study show that specific expert
perceptions are related to certain measures of strategic
performance, especially ROA.

Table 5-2 contains selected

references to literature that relate to these results.

Accounting
Accounting measures,
investment,

and especially return on

have been often criticized (Fisher & McGowan,

1983; Solomon,

1971; Harcourt,

1965).

Curtis

(1985)

suggests that the accounting system fails to recognize
non-financial

transactions,

preserve assets.

Yet,

such as the failure to

ROA was found to be significantly

related to use of corporate assets,
36.

In Table 4-36,

in Tables 4-19 and 4 -

ROA was found to be significantly

related to most of the other dimensions of reputation.
It appears that ROA does correspond to the perceptions of
experts in a variety of dimensions.

Other accounting and

market measures of performance and risk generally are not
significantly related.

This lends some support to the

value of ROA as a summary measure of strategic
performance.
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Attribution
Attribution theory suggests that reputation,
especially for quality of management,

is related to prior

performance.
Butterfield and Powell

(1981)

found that performance

descriptions explained nearly half of the variance in
attributions of leadership style.

Tables 4-3 and 4-4

report several

significant relations between reputation

and prior ROA.

Quality of management specifically was

significant only for group 1, but abililty to attract,
develop, and keep talented people was significant for
both groups.

This suggests a selectivity in attribution

by experts.
A significant negative relationship between perceived
quality of management for 1982 and change in perceived
quality of management from 1982 to 1984, Table 4-18, may
be due to operation of the covariance principle (Kelley,
1967).

The covariance principle states that we attribute

the cause of an action to the one factor with which it
most strongly covaries.

We may be most willing to

attribute high or low quality of management when that
represents a change.
Prior ROA was more often significantly related to
reputation than was total

stock return.

represents distinctiveness information
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ROA likely
(Kelley,

1971),

in

that it is a prominent, widely reported measure.
may observe more covariance (Kelley,

Experts

1967) with ROA than

with stock return, which is more random.

Business
The significant relations observed between prior ROA
and reputation confirm statements made by the Fortune
authors.

"Big Blues'

decline (in reputation)

two years of disappointing profits

(Schultz,

reflects
1988)."

Economics
The literature of economics suggests there is a
relationship between reputation and subsequent
performance.

Shapiro

(1983) points out that reputation

is an asset.

Reputation sometimes appears on balance

sheets as "good will."
Cornell

and Shapiro

(1986) discuss the influence of

reputation on the price stakeholders will
pay for implicit claims.

be willing to

Reputation for quality of

management was found to be related to subsequent ROA for
industrial

firms, Table 4-31.

influence total

It does not apparently

stock return, which includes the price

stockholders pay for a firm's implicit future stream of
earnings, Table 4-24.
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Cornell

and

Shapiro also suggest that reputation

gained from performance on one set of implicit claims may
influence customers' willingness to pay for another set
of implicit claims.

Similarly,

reputation gained in one

dimension might influence reputation in another
dimension.

The reputation for high quality of a firm's

products might influence its reputation for ability to
attract, develop, and keep talented people.

In fact, the

various dimensions of reputation were found to be highly
correlated.

Finance
Black (1980)

states that users of financial

statements want an earnings figure that results in a
constant price-earnings ratio.

They want to see

accounting measures that bear a dependable current
relation to market measures.
marginal

In the present study,

quality of management was found to be

significantly related to contemporaneous total

stock

return, while other reputation measures were related to
contemporaneous ROA.
Several
1976)

authors

(e.g.

Branch & Gale,

1983;

Fama,

suggest that investors consider quality of

managment, while Granatelli

and Martin

(1984)

found that

stock market returns of "well managed" firms did not
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outperform a portfolio of randomly selected companies
from the

same industries.

These views may be reconciled

by the present results in that while quality of
management is not significantly related to total
return

(see Table 4-39), the change in quality of

management, marginal
4-42).

stock

quality of management,

is

(see Table

A possible reason for this may be the difference

threshold, discussed under perception, below.
Feigenbaum and Thomas

(1986) discuss the evidence on

the expected risk-return relationship,
not be observed ex-post.
systematic risk,

Beta,

the market measure of

is related to subsequent ROA, as

reported in Tables 4-26 and 4-31.

It is also related to

contemporaneous ROA (see Table 4-34).
measure of risk, debt to assets,
(see Table 4-2),

that may or may

An accounting

is related to prior ROA

as is beta (see Table 4-15).

Debt to

assets is also related to contemporaneous ROA, Table 435.

It is interesting that,

in the present study,

risk

measures are related to accounting return but not to
stock market return.

Marketing
The popular literature focuses on how a firm may gain
a good reputation, and public relations and advertising
firms are engaged to accomplish this.
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Marketing News

(1986)

cites Brouillard about what characteristics are

important to a winning reputation.

The present findings

suggest that profitability is a key characteristic.

Perception
Bernardin and Beatty
effect may have a serious
evaluations

(1984)

suggest that the halo

impact on performance

in organizations.

The various dimensions of

reputation are highly correlated,

Table 4-45,

though they

represent different areas of organizational
responsibility,

and so could represent a problem for

performance evaluation.
In general,

perceptions of quality of management are

not related to total
variable, marginal

stock return,

quality of management was very

significantly related to total

stock return,

more so than were prior residuals,
risk.

Marginal

but a newly created

beta,

Table 4-42,

or accounting

quality of management represents the

percent change in management from 1982 to 1984.
change may be related to total

This

stock return because it

represents a difference threshold

(Dember,

1964):

investors perceive a difference in management rather than
its absolute quality and influence stock price
accordingly.
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Perceptual
1979)

lag

(Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth,

is apparantly less than the lag considered in the

present study, as reputation was more often significantly
related to performance when the measures were
simultaneous three-year averages, Table 4-36, than when
performance represented a prior three-year period, Tables
4-3 and 4-4.

Research Methods
Kerlinger (1973) discusses measurement as
essentially a relation.

The present study contributes

information about a variety of relationships finding
several

that are significant,

been but are not.

and many that might have

For example, perceived quality

management might have been found to be measure of stock
return,

but marginal

quality of management is a better

measure.

Strategic Management
Finance theory,
(1987)

as presented by Aaker and Jacobson

and Lubatkin and O'Neill

risk will

be related to return.

(1987),

suggests that

The present study

suggests that it generally is not.

This does not mean

that it does not represent important information.
contrary,

To the

it is an independent piece of information that
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might be considered separate from return in evaluating a
firm or its managers.
Ramanujam's

(1986)

recommendation on incorporating a

variety of measures.
(1986)

This follows Venkatraman and

Hackett (1985) and Chakravarthy

suggest that managers represent all

stakeholders.

The relationship of various dimensions of reputation to
ROA suggests that managers are perceived as representing
a variety of interests to generate profits.
The final

conclusion is that expert perceptions are

related to ROA,

in keeping with the observation of

McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill

(1986) that accounting

based measures are predominant.

Quality of management

was significantly related to ROA in both prior and
subsequent time periods.

ROA is one of the most easily

understood and widely circulated of firm performance
measures.

Its salience, attributed causal

relationships,

and a halo effect may account for the strong association
with various perceptions of a firm.

The Fortune survey

data should be regarded as a valuable predictor of future
ROA.

Expert perceptions generally are not related to

other measures of strategic performance.
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TABLE 5-2
SELECTED LITERATURE RELATING TO THE RESULTS
Accounting
Curtis, 1985

Fisher & McGowan,
1983; Solomon,
1971; Harcourt,
1965
Attribution
Butterfield and
Powel1, 1981

The accounting system reports only
financial transactions, while
ignoring other important business
events such as the failure to
preserve assets, decisions to
downgrade product quality, and
technological changes that make
equipment obsolete.
Scholars have strongly criticized
ROI: the return in the numerator is
not necessarily related to the
investment in the denominator.
Performance descriptions explained
nearly half of the variance in
attributions of leadership style.

Kelley,

1967

The covariance principle states that
we attribute the cause of an action
to the one factor with which it most
strongly covaries.

Kelley,

1971

Attributions are based on three
types of information.
Distinctiveness information
indicates how prominent a factor is.
Consensus information indicates
whether other individuals in the
situation are associated with the
same results.
Consistency
information indicates whether the
association is stable over time.

Business
Schultz, 1988

"Big Blues decline reflects two
years of disappointing profits."
(continued next page)
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TABLE 5-2 (continued).
Economics
Cornel 1 and
Shapiro, 1986

Reputation influences performance
because the price stakeholders will
pay for implicit claims depends on
their expectations of future
payouts.

Cornel 1 and
Shapiro, 1986

Reputation gained from performance
on one set of implicit claims may
influence customers' willingness to
pay for another set of implicit
claims.

Shapiro,

Reputation is "an asset."

1983

Finance
Black, 1980

Users of financial statements want
an earnings figure that results in a
constant price-earnings ratio.
They
want to see accounting measures that
bear a dependable current relation
to market measures.

Branch and Gale,
1983: 41

A favorable stock market evaluation
of upper-level management justifies
attractive managerial compensation
packages, keeps shareholders happy,
allows easier access to capital,
facilitates relatively inexpensive
acquisitions, and defends against
takeovers.

Fama, 1976;
Brealey & Myers,
1984: 64-81, 248257

Tests have shown that in setting the
market value of firms, investors
adjust for differences in firms'
accounting procedures.
Investors
are thought to immediately evaluate
the impact of management change on a
firm's future earnings.

Fiegenbaum and
Thomas, 1986

Contradictory empirical evidence on
the risk-return relationship.
Exante, ex-post differences.
(continued next page)
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TABLE 5-2 (continued)
Granatelli and
Martin 1984

Stock market returns of "well
managed" firms did not outperform a
portfolio of randomly selected
companies from the
same industries.

Louis
Harris and
Associates, 1975

A Harris poll found that major
institutional
investors considered
the quality of management to be the
single most important criterion in
the selection of stocks.

Marketing
B r o ui11 a r d , in
Marketing News,
1986

Perception
Bernard in &
Beatty, 1984
Dember,

1964

Schneider,
Hastorf, and
El 1sworth, 1979
Research Methods
Kerlinger, 1973

Characteristics important to a
winning reputation include quality
of products, flexibility, highcaliber management, honesty,
customer service, market leadership,
and good communications.
The halo effect may have a serious
impact on performance evaluations in
organizations.
Difference threshold.
Perceptual lag, halo effect,
selective perception.

Measurement is a relation.

Strategic Management
Aaker and
Systematic and unsystematic risk.
Jacobson, 1987
Chakravarthy,
1986

Excellent organizations are
distinguished by the quality of
their transformations and by their
satisfaction of all stakeholders.

Hackett,

Managers' decisions may represent
the interests of all stakeholders.

1985

(continued next page)
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TABLE 5-2 (continued)
Lubatkin
and
O'Neill, 1987

Mergers may increase risk generally.
Related mergers may decrease
systematic risk.

McGuire,
Schneeweis,
Hill, 1986

In a review of selected literature
of organizational performance,
accounting based measures were found
to be dominant.

and

Venkatraman and
Ramanujam, 1986

Useful research will involve
different data sources: primary and
secondary; financial and
operational.
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Directions for Further Research

A number of the findings of the present study suggest
questions for further research.

Why were the two groups,

carefully matched for industries and quality of
management,

so consistently different in the significance

of relationships tested?
marginal

The surprising relationship of

quality of management to total

merits further study.

stock return

What is the relationship to future

stock return?
What are the perceptions of managers and investors
about the causal
and performance?

relationships between management quality
How are management and investment

decisions based on such perceptions?
perceptions over time?
unpredictable events,

How stable are

How are they affected by
like the Bhopal

disaster?

Finally, there is no pristine ideal
waiting to be revealed.

of performance

Steers argued that "a meaningful

way to understand the abstract idea of effectiveness is
to consider how researchers have operationalized and
measured the construct in their work"

(1975: 546).

Cameron and Whetton noted that:
As a construct, organizational

effectiveness is similar

to an unmapped terrain, where the responsibility lies
with the investigator to chart it (1983).
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But the construct of organizational
not an autonomous reality to be charted.

effectiveness is
Nor is an

organization's performance a pure and absolute fact that
we will

one day measure with precision and certainty.

"Woo and Willard (1983)

(used) the PIMS data base to

explicate the underlying dimensions of performance..."
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam,
"performance?"
it,

1986: 806).

Performance "is" whatever we all

think of

and what we together agree it is, not once and for

all, but in a dynamic social
all

Underlying what

stakeholders.

construction with respect to

The objective of the present study is

to contribute to the process of understanding that
dynamic social

construction.

We continually choose how

we measure performance, whether consciously, or by
default.

It is hoped the present study will

that choice.
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help inform

ENDNOTES

1.

Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT service consists of a

number of computer readable libraries of financial,
statistical

and market information covering several

thousand industrial
2.

and non-industrial

companies.

While most mergers might be expected to reduce risk

because of diversification, mergers do introduce some
uncertainty, particularly around the event date.
this reason,

For

increases in risk, at least temporary ones,

would not be surprising.
3.

The market model

expresses the return on an asset as

a linear function of the market return, R , plus a random
error component,e •

(Lee,1985):

R. = a•.
11

4.

11

+ b•Rm + e .
l

m

l

Close study of Lee (1985:225) reveals inconsistent

use of the time subscript, which has been corrected here.

5.

It should be noted that the mean adjusted return

approach, mentioned first,
past returns:

is based on the average of

i.e. a=l and p=0.

referred to as the "naive model."
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This is sometimes

6.

Data from 1985 and 1986 were added for correlation

analysis of the Fortune variables only.

The survey

published in January of each year contains data collected
in the prior year.

The first year of the survey

collected data for 1982, which was published in 1983.
7.

The industries

(were)

25 of the largest in the

fortune 500 and Fortune Service 500 directories of U.S.
industrial

and non-industrial corporations.

Industry

groups are based on categories established by the U.S.
Office of Management and the Budget.

Companies are

assigned to industry groups according to the business
that contributed most to the prior year's sales
assets,
8.

for certain industries)

(Sellers, 1985:18).

Here quality of management is one of the eight simple

attributes, not the average of all
9.

(or

eight.

The z-score of a variable X is also called the

"standardized version of X," and calculated:

h(X) = (X-mx)/ox

where

u

A

= Mean of X.

a* = Variance of X.
A
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The mean and variance of a standardized random
variable are always
Wichern,

0

and

1,

1975) .
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respectively

(Miller and
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